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Abstract
Many researchers have argued that humanity will create artificial general intelligence (AGI)
within the next twenty to one hundred years. It has been suggested that AGI may inflict serious
damage to human well-being on a global scale (‘catastrophic risk’). After summarizing the
arguments for why AGI may pose such a risk, we review the fieldʼs proposed responses to AGI
risk. We consider societal proposals, proposals for external constraints on AGI behaviors and
proposals for creating AGIs that are safe due to their internal design.
Keywords: artificial general intelligence, existential risk, catastrophic risk, AI risk, artificial
intelligence, friendly AI, machine ethics
1. Introduction3
Many have argued that in the next twenty to one hundred
years we will create artificial general intelligences (AGIs)
[39, 46, 170, 193, 196, 200, 235, 288]4. Unlike current
‘narrow’ AI systems, AGIs would perform at or above the
human level not merely in particular domains (e.g., chess or
arithmetic), but in a wide variety of domains, including novel
ones5. They would have a robust understanding of natural
language and be capable of general problem solving.
The creation of AGI could pose challenges and risks of
varied severity for society, such as the possibility of AGIs out
competing humans in the job market [60, 189]. This article,
however, focuses on the suggestion that AGIs may come to
act in ways not intended by their creators, and in this way
pose a catastrophic [52] or even an existential [47] risk to
humanity6. We will organize and summarize the proposals
that have been made so far for responding to catastrophic AGI
risk, so as to provide a map of the field to newcomers and
veterans alike7.
Section 2 explains why AGI may pose a catastrophic
risk. Sections 3–5 review three categories of proposals for
dealing with AGI risk: societal proposals, proposals for
external constraints on AGI behaviors, and proposals for
creating AGIs that are safe due to their internal design.
Although the main purpose of this paper is to provide a
summary of existing work, we briefly provide commentary on
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title of the work, journal citation and DOI.
3 This paper elaborates and expands upon some of the discussion originally
found in Yampolskiy [304], as well as reviewing a large amount of additional
material.
4 For a preliminary ‘AGI roadmap’, see Adams et al [10]. For a variety of
views, see Eden [5]. The term ‘AGI’ was introduced by Gubrud [124]. For
overviews of AGI approaches, see Wang et al [288] and Adams et al [10].
Some closely related terms are ‘strong AI’ (e.g., [170]) and ‘human-level AI’
(e.g., [67, 190]). Unlike the term ‘human-level AI’, the term ‘artificial general
intelligence’ does not necessarily presume that the intelligence will be
human-like.
5 For this paper, we use a binary distinction between narrow AI and AGI.
This is merely for the sake of simplicity: we do not assume the actual
difference between the two categories to necessarily be so clean-cut.
6 A catastrophic risk is something that might inflict serious damage to
human well-being on a global scale and cause ten million or more fatalities
[52]. An existential risk is one that threatens human extinction [47]. Many
writers argue that AGI might be a risk of such magnitude
[3, 44, 47, 64, 65, 68, 72, 82, 117, 126, 129, 160, 189, 193, 278, 289,
300, 309].
7 One important work in this field is Bostrom [3], published after this paper
was originally written. It introduces some additional proposals as well as
discussing many of the ones reviewed in this work, but time constraints
involved in the publication of this paper did not allow us to update this work
to take it properly into account.
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the proposals in each major subsection of sections 3–5 and
highlight some of the proposals we consider the most pro-
mising in section 6.
Attempting to influence the course of developing tech-
nologies involves a great deal of uncertainty concerning the
nature of those technologies and the likely long-term impacts
of societal decisions [50]. While we aim to provide a pre-
liminary analysis of many proposals, we do not have final
answers. The purpose of this article is to act as a review and to
highlight some considerations that will be useful starting
points for further research.
In the hopes of fostering further debate, we also highlight
some of the proposals that we consider the most promising. In
the medium term, these are regulation (section 3.3), merging
with machines (section 3.4), AGI confinement (section 4.1),
Oracle AI (section 5.1) and motivational weaknesses
(section 5.6). In the long term, the most promising approaches
seem to be value learning (section 5.2.5) and human-like
architectures (section 5.3.4). Section 6 provides an extended
discussion of the various merits and problems of these
proposals.
2. Catastrophic AGI risk
We begin with a brief sketch of the argument that AGI poses
a catastrophic risk to humanity. At least two separate lines of
argument seem to support this conclusion.
First, AI has already made it possible to automate many
jobs [60] and AGIs, when they are created, should be capable
of performing most jobs better than humans
[130, 136, 189, 289]. As humanity grows increasingly reliant
on AGIs, these AGIs will begin to wield more and more
influence and power. Even if AGIs initially function as sub-
servient tools, an increasing number of decisions will be made
by autonomous AGIs rather than by humans. Over time it
would become ever more difficult to replace the AGIs, even if
they no longer remained subservient.
Second, there may be a sudden discontinuity in which
AGIs rapidly become far more numerous or intelligent
[72, 117, 244, 251, 306]. This could happen due to (1) a
conceptual breakthrough which makes it easier to run AGIs
using far less hardware, (2) AGIs using fast computing
hardware to develop ever-faster hardware, or (3) AGIs
crossing a threshold in intelligence that allows them to
carry out increasingly fast software self-improvement.
Even if the AGIs were expensive to develop at first, they
could be cheaply copied and could thus spread quickly
once created.
Once they become powerful enough, AGIs might be a
threat to humanity even if they are not actively malevolent or
hostile. Mere indifference to human values—including human
survival—could be sufficient for AGIs to pose an existential
threat [211, 212, 309, 312].
We will now lay out the above reasoning in more detail.
2.1. Most tasks will be automated
Ever since the Industrial Revolution, society has become
increasingly automated. Brynjolfsson [60] argue that the
current high unemployment rate in the United States is par-
tially due to rapid advances in information technology, which
has made it possible to replace human workers with compu-
ters faster than human workers can be trained in jobs that
computers cannot yet perform. Vending machines are repla-
cing shop attendants, automated discovery programs which
locate relevant legal documents are replacing lawyers and
legal aides, and automated virtual assistants are replacing
customer service representatives.
Labor is becoming automated for reasons of cost, effi-
ciency and quality. Once a machine becomes capable of
performing a task as well as (or almost as well as) a human,
the cost of purchasing and maintaining it may be less than the
cost of having a salaried human perform the same task. In
many cases, machines are also capable of doing the same job
faster, for longer periods and with fewer errors. In addition to
replacing workers entirely, machines may also take over
aspects of jobs that were once the sole domain of highly
trained professionals, making the job easier to perform by
less-skilled employees [298].
If workers can be affordably replaced by developing
more sophisticated AI, there is a strong economic incentive to
do so. This is already happening with narrow AI, which often
requires major modifications or even a complete redesign in
order to be adapted for new tasks. ‘A roadmap for US
robotics’ [154] calls for major investments into automation,
citing the potential for considerable improvements in the
fields of manufacturing, logistics, health care and services.
Similarly, the US Air Force Chief Scientistʼs [78] ‘Technol-
ogy horizons’ report mentions ‘increased use of autonomy
and autonomous systems’ as a key area of research to focus
on in the next decade, and also notes that reducing the need
for manpower provides the greatest potential for cutting costs.
In 2000, the US Congress instructed the armed forces to have
one third of their deep strike force aircraft be unmanned by
2010, and one third of their ground combat vehicles be
unmanned by 2015 [4].
To the extent that an AGI could learn to do many kinds
of tasks—or even any kind of task—without needing an
extensive re-engineering effort, the AGI could make the
replacement of humans by machines much cheaper and more
profitable. As more tasks become automated, the bottlenecks
for further automation will require adaptability and flexibility
that narrow-AI systems are incapable of. These will then
make up an increasing portion of the economy, further
strengthening the incentive to develop AGI.
Increasingly sophisticated AI may eventually lead to
AGI, possibly within the next several decades [39, 200].
Eventually it will make economic sense to automate all or
nearly all jobs [130, 136, 289]. As AGIs will possess many
advantages over humans [200, 253], a greater and greater
proportion of the workforce will consist of intelligent
machines.
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2.2. AGIs might harm humans
AGIs might bestow overwhelming military, economic, or
political power on the groups that control them [47]. For
example, automation could lead to an ever-increasing transfer
of wealth and power to the owners of the AGIs [54, 60]. AGIs
could also be used to develop advanced weapons and plans
for military operations or political takeovers [47, 124, 163].
Some of these scenarios could lead to catastrophic risks,
depending on the capabilities of the AGIs and other factors.
Our focus is on the risk from the possibility that AGIs
could behave in unexpected and harmful ways, even if the
intentions of their owners were benign. Even modern-day
narrow-AI systems are becoming autonomous and powerful
enough that they sometimes take unanticipated and harmful
actions before a human supervisor has a chance to react. To
take one example, rapid automated trading was found to have
contributed to the 2010 stock market ‘flash crash’ [70]8.
Autonomous systems may also cause people difficulties in
more mundane situations, such as when a credit card is
automatically flagged as possibly stolen due to an unusual
usage pattern [16], or when automatic defense systems mal-
function and cause deaths [240].
As machines become more autonomous, humans will have
fewer opportunities to intervene in time and will be forced to
rely on machines making good choices. This has prompted the
creation of the field of ‘machine ethics’ [1, 16, 282], concerned
with creating AI systems designed to make appropriate moral
choices. Compared to narrow-AI systems, AGIs will be even
more autonomous and capable, and will thus require even more
robust solutions for governing their behavior9.
If some AGIs were both powerful and indifferent to
human values, the consequences could be disastrous. At one
extreme, powerful AGIs indifferent to human survival could
bring about human extinction. As Yudkowsky [309] writes,
‘The AI does not hate you, nor does it love you, but you are
made out of atoms which it can use for something else’.
Omohundro [211, 212] and Bostrom [51] argue that
standard microeconomic theory prescribes particular instru-
mental behaviors which are useful for the achievement of
almost any set of goals. Furthermore, any agents which do not
follow certain axioms of rational behavior will possess vul-
nerabilities which some other agent may exploit to their own
benefit. Thus AGIs which understand these principles and
wish to act efficiently will modify themselves so that their
behavior more closely resembles rational economic behavior
[213]. Extra resources are useful in the pursuit of nearly any
set of goals and self-preservation behaviors will increase the
probability that the agent can continue to further its goals.
AGI systems which follow rational economic theory will then
exhibit tendencies toward behaviors such as self-replicating,
breaking into other machines and acquiring resources without
regard for anyone elseʼs safety. They will also attempt to
improve themselves in order to more effectively achieve these
and other goals, which could lead to rapid improvement even
if the designers did not intend the agent to self-improve.
Even AGIs that were explicitly designed to behave
ethically might end up acting at cross-purposes to humanity,
because it is difficult to precisely capture the complexity of
human values in machine goal systems [30, 199, 309, 312].
Muehlhauser [199] caution that moral philosophy has
found no satisfactory formalization of human values. All moral
theories proposed so far would lead to undesirable consequences
if implemented by superintelligent machines. For example, a
machine programmed to maximize the satisfaction of human (or
sentient) preferences might simply modify peopleʼs brains to
give them desires that are maximally easy to satisfy.
Intuitively, one might say that current moral theories are
all too simple—even if they seem correct at first glance, they
do not actually take into account all the things that we value
and this leads to a catastrophic outcome. This could be
referred to as the complexity of value thesis. Recent psycho-
logical and neuroscientific experiments confirm that human
values are highly complex [199], that the pursuit of pleasure
is not the only human value [7] and that humans are often
unaware of their own values [96, 197, 302].
Still, perhaps powerful AGIs would have desirable con-
sequences so long as they were programmed to respect most
human values. If so, then our inability to perfectly specify
human values in AGI designs need not pose a catastrophic
risk. Different cultures and generations have historically had
very different values from each other and it seems likely that
over time our values would become considerably different
from current-day ones. It could be enough to maintain some
small set of core values, though what exactly would constitute
a core value is unclear10.
Yudkowsky [312] argues that, due to the fragility of
value, the basic problem remains. He argues that, even if an
AGI implemented most human values, the outcome might still
be unacceptable. For example, an AGI which failed to
incorporate the value of novelty could create a solar system
filled with countless minds experiencing one highly optimal
and satisfying experience over and over again, never doing or
feeling anything else [311]11.
8 On the less serious front, see Eisen [94] for an amusing example of
automated trading going awry.
9 In practice, there have been two separate communities doing research on
automated moral decision-making [13, 199, 246]. The ‘AGI ethics’
community has concentrated specifically on advanced AGIs (e.g.,
[110, 309]), while the ‘machine ethics’ community typically has concentrated
on more immediate applications for current-day AI (e.g., [1, 284]). In this
paper, we have cited the machine ethics literature only where it seemed
relevant, leaving out papers that seemed to be too focused on narrow-AI
systems for our purposes. In particular, we have left out most discussions of
military machine ethics [26], which focus primarily on the constrained
special case of creating systems that are safe for battlefield usage. Note that
while the term ‘machine ethics’ is relatively established, ‘AGI ethics’ is not.
One proposed alternative name for the ‘AGI ethics’ discipline is ‘AI safety
engineering’ [304, 305].
10 For example, different people may disagree over whether freedom or
well-being is a more important value.
11 Miller [189] similarly notes that, despite a common belief to the contrary,
it is impossible to write laws in a manner that would match our stated moral
principles without a judge needing to use a large amount of implicit common-
sense knowledge to correctly interpret them: ‘Laws shouldnʼt always be
interpreted literally because legislators canʼt anticipate all possible con-
tingencies. Also, humans’ intuitive feel for what constitutes murder goes
beyond anything we can commit to paper. The same applies to
friendliness’ [189].
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In this paper, we will frequently refer to the problem of
‘AGI safety’ or ‘safe AGI’, by which we mean the problem of
ensuring that AGIs respect human values, or perhaps some
extrapolation or idealization of human values12. We do not
seek to imply that current human values would be the best
possible ones, that AGIs could not help us in developing our
values further, or that the values of other sentient beings
would be irrelevant. Rather, by ‘human values’ we refer to the
kinds of basic values that nearly all humans would agree
upon, such as that AGIs forcibly reprogramming peopleʼs
brains, or destroying humanity, would be a bad outcome. In
cases where proposals related to AGI risk might change
human values in some major but not as obviously catastrophic
way, we will mention the possibility of these changes but
remain agnostic on whether they are desirable or undesirable.
We conclude this section with one frequently forgotten
point: in order to avoid catastrophic risks or worse, it is not
enough to ensure that only some AGIs are safe. Proposals
which seek to solve the issue of catastrophic AGI risk need to
also provide some mechanism for ensuring that most (or
perhaps even ‘nearly all’) AGIs are either created safe or
prevented from doing considerable harm.
2.3. AGIs may become powerful quickly
There are several reasons why AGIs may quickly come to
wield unprecedented power in society. ‘Wielding power’ may
mean having direct decision-making power, or it may mean
carrying out human decisions in a way that makes the decision
maker reliant on the AGI. For example, in a corporate context
an AGI could be acting as the executive of the company, or it
could be carrying out countless low-level tasks which the
corporation needs to perform as part of its daily operations.
Bugaj [63] consider three kinds of AGI scenarios: capped
intelligence, soft takeoff and hard takeoff. In a capped intel-
ligence scenario, all AGIs are prevented from exceeding a
predetermined level of intelligence and remain at a level
roughly comparable with humans. In a soft takeoff scenario,
AGIs become far more powerful than humans, but on a
timescale which permits ongoing human interaction during
the ascent. Time is not of the essence, and learning proceeds
at a relatively human-like pace. In a hard takeoff scenario, an
AGI will undergo an extraordinarily fast increase in power,
taking effective control of the world within a few years or
less13. In this scenario, there is little time for error correction
or a gradual tuning of the AGIʼs goals.
The viability of many proposed approaches depends on
the hardness of a takeoff. The more time there is to react and
adapt to developing AGIs, the easier it is to control them. A
soft takeoff might allow for an approach of incremental
machine ethics [223], which would not require us to have a
complete philosophical theory of ethics and values, but would
rather allow us to solve problems in a gradual manner. A soft
takeoff might however present its own problems, such as
there being a larger number of AGIs distributed throughout
the economy, making it harder to contain an eventual takeoff.
Hard takeoff scenarios can be roughly divided into those
involving the quantity of hardware (the hardware overhang
scenario), the quality of hardware (the speed explosion sce-
nario) and the quality of software (the intelligence explosion
scenario). Although we discuss them separately, it seems
plausible that several of them could happen simultaneously
and feed into each other.
2.3.1. Hardware overhang. Hardware progress may outpace
AGI software progress. Contemporary supercomputers
already rival or even exceed some estimates of the
computational capacity of the human brain, while no
software seems to have both the brainʼs general learning
capacity and its scalability.
Bostrom [46] estimates that the effective computing
capacity of the human brain might be somewhere around 1017
operations per second (OPS) and Moravec [195] estimates it
at 1014 OPS. As of November 2012, the fastest supercomputer
in the world had achieved a top capacity of 1016 floating-point
operations per second (FLOPS) and the five-hundredth fastest
a top capacity of 1013 FLOPS [188]. Note however that OPS
and FLOPS are not directly comparable and there is no
reliable way of inter-converting the two. Sandberg and
Bostrom [234] estimate that OPS and FLOPS grow at a
roughly comparable rate.
If such trends continue, then by the time the software for
AGI is invented there may be a computing overhang—an
abundance of cheap hardware available for running thousands
or millions of AGIs, possibly with a speed of thought much
faster than that of humans [244, 253, 310].
As increasingly sophisticated AGI software becomes
available, it would be possible to rapidly copy improvements
to millions of servers, each new version being capable of
doing more kinds of work or being run with less hardware.
Thus, the AGI software could replace an increasingly large
fraction of the workforce14. The need for AGI systems to be
trained for some jobs would slow the rate of adoption, but
powerful computers could allow for fast training. If AGIs end
12 Within the AGI ethics literature, safe autonomous AGI is sometimes
called ‘friendly AI’ [115, 183, 189, 307, 309, 312]. Yudkowsky [307] defines
‘friendly AI’ as ‘the production of human-benefiting, non-human-harming
actions in Artificial Intelligence systems that have advanced to the point of
making real-world plans in pursuit of goals’. However, some papers (e.g.,
Goertzel [105, 108, 294]) use ‘friendly AI’ as a narrower term to refer to safe
AGI designs as advocated by Yudkowsky [307, 309]. These designs have the
goal of benefiting humans as their overarching value, from which all the other
goals and values of the system are derived. In this paper we use the term
‘friendly AI’ to refer to Yudkowskyʼs proposal and ‘safe AGI’ as our more
general term.
13 Bugaj and Goertzel defined hard takeoff to refer to a period of months or
less. We have chosen a somewhat longer time period, as even a few years
might easily turn out to be too little time for society to properly react.
14 The speed that would allow AGIs to take over most jobs would depend on
the cost of the hardware and the granularity of the software upgrades. A series
of upgrades over an extended period, each producing a 1% improvement,
would lead to a more gradual transition than a single upgrade that brought the
software from the capability level of a chimpanzee to a rough human
equivalence. Note also that several companies, including Amazon and
Google, offer vast amounts of computing power for rent on an hourly basis.
An AGI that acquired money and then invested all of it in renting a large
amount of computing resources for a brief period could temporarily achieve a
much larger boost than its budget would otherwise suggest.
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up doing the vast majority of work in society, humans could
become dependent on them.
AGIs could also plausibly take control of Internet-
connected machines in order to harness their computing
power [253]; Internet-connected machines are regularly
compromised15.
2.3.2. Speed explosion. Another possibility is a speed
explosion [72, 158, 251, 306], in which intelligent machines
design increasingly faster machines. A hardware overhang
might contribute to a speed explosion, but is not required for
it. An AGI running at the pace of a human could develop a
second generation of hardware on which it could run at a rate
faster than human thought. It would then require a shorter
time to develop a third generation of hardware, allowing it to
run faster than on the previous generation, and so on. At some
point, the process would hit physical limits and stop, but by
that time AGIs might come to accomplish most tasks at far
faster rates than humans, thereby achieving dominance. (In
principle, the same process could also be achieved via
improved software.)
The extent to which the AGI needs humans in order to
produce better hardware will limit the pace of the speed
explosion, so a rapid speed explosion requires the ability to
automate a large proportion of the hardware manufacturing
process. However, this kind of automation may already be
achieved by the time that AGI is developed16.
2.3.3. Intelligence explosion. Third, there could be an
intelligence explosion, in which one AGI figures out how to
create a qualitatively smarter AGI and that AGI uses its
increased intelligence to create still more intelligent AGIs,
and so on17, such that the intelligence of humankind is
quickly left far behind and the machines achieve dominance
[72, 117, 177, 200]18.
Yudkowsky [309, 310] argues that an intelligence
explosion is likely. So far, natural selection has been
improving human intelligence and human intelligence has
to some extent been able to improve itself. However, the core
process by which natural selection improves humanity has
been essentially unchanged and humans have been unable to
deeply affect the cognitive algorithms which produce their
own intelligence. Yudkowsky suggests that if a mind became
capable of directly editing itself, this could spark a rapid
increase in intelligence, as the actual process causing
increases in intelligence could itself be improved upon. (This
requires that there exist powerful improvements which, when
implemented, considerably increase the rate at which such
minds can improve themselves.)
Hall [130] argues that, based on standard economic
considerations, it would not make sense for an AGI to focus
its resources on solitary self-improvement. Rather, in order
not to be left behind by society at large, it should focus its
resources on doing the things that it is good at and trade for
the things it is not good at. However, once there exists a
community of AGIs that can trade with one another, this
community could collectively undergo rapid improvement
and leave humans behind.
A number of formal growth models have been developed
which are relevant to predicting the speed of a takeoff; an
overview of these can be found in Sandbergʼs [231] paper.
Many of them suggest rapid growth. For instance, Hanson
[134] suggests that AGI might lead to the economy doubling
in months rather than years. However, Hanson is skeptical
about whether this would prove a major risk to humanity and
considers it mainly an economic transition similar to the
Industrial Revolution.
To some extent, the soft/hard takeoff distinction may be a
false dichotomy: a takeoff may be soft for a while, and then
become hard. Two of the main factors influencing the speed
of a takeoff are the pace at which computing hardware is
developed and the ease of modifying minds [253]. This
allows for scenarios in which AGI is developed and there
seems to be a soft takeoff for, say, the initial ten years,
causing a false sense of security until a breakthrough in
hardware development causes a hard takeoff.
Another factor that might cause a false sense of security
is the possibility that AGIs can be developed by a
combination of insights from humans and AGIs themselves.
As AGIs become more intelligent and it becomes possible to
automate portions of the development effort, those parts
accelerate and the parts requiring human effort become
bottlenecks. Reducing the amount of human insight required
could dramatically accelerate the speed of improvement.
Halving the amount of human involvement required might at
most double the speed of development, possibly giving an
impression of relative safety, but going from 50% human
insight required to 1% human insight required could cause the
development to become ninety-nine times faster19.
15 Botnets are networks of computers that have been compromised by
outside attackers and are used for illegitimate purposes. Rajab et al [226]
review several studies which estimate the sizes of the largest botnets as being
between a few thousand to 350 000 bots. Modern-day malware could
theoretically infect any susceptible Internet-connected machine within tens of
seconds of its initial release [257]. The Slammer worm successfully infected
more than 90% of vulnerable hosts within ten minutes and had infected at
least 75 000 machines by the thirty minute mark [192]. The previous record
holder in speed, the Code Red worm, took fourteen hours to infect more than
359 000 machines [191].
16 Loosemore [177] also suggest that current companies carrying out
research and development are more constrained by a lack of capable
researchers than by the ability to carry out physical experiments.
17 Most accounts of this scenario do not give exact definitions for
‘intelligence’ or explain what a ‘superintelligent’ AGI would be like, instead
using informal characterizations such as ‘a machine that can surpass the
intellectual activities of any man however clever’ [117] or ‘an intellect that is
much smarter than the best human brains in practically every field, including
scientific creativity, general wisdom and social skills’ [46]. Yudkowsky [309]
defines intelligence in relation to ‘optimization power’, the ability to reliably
hit small targets in large search spaces, such as by finding the a priori
exceedingly unlikely organization of atoms which makes up a car. A more
mathematical definition of machine intelligence is offered by Legg [173].
Sotala [253] discusses some of the functional routes to actually achieving
superintelligence.
18 One example of an AGI framework designed specifically for repeated
self-improvement is offered by Schmidhuber [236].
19 The relationship in question is similar to that described by Amdahlʼs
[17] law.
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From a safety viewpoint, the conservative assumption is
to presume the worst [307]. Yudkowsky argues that the worst
outcome would be a hard takeoff, as it would give us the least
time to prepare and correct errors. On the other hand, it can
also be argued that a soft takeoff would be just as bad, as it
would allow the creation of multiple competing AGIs,
allowing the AGIs that were the least burdened with goals
such as ‘respect human values’ to prevail. We would ideally
like a solution, or a combination of solutions, which would
work effectively for both a soft and a hard takeoff.
3. Societal proposals
The notion of catastrophic AGI risk is not new and this
concern was expressed by early thinkers in the field
[64, 117, 269, 300]. Hence, there have also been many pro-
posals concerning what to do about it. The proposals we
review are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive: the best
way of achieving a desirable outcome may involve pursuing
several proposals simultaneously.
Proposals can be divided into three general categories:
proposals for societal action, design proposals for external
constraints on AGI behavior and design recommendations for
internal constraints on AGI behavior. In this section we
briefly review societal proposals. These include doing noth-
ing, integrating AGIs with society, regulating research, mer-
ging with machines and relinquishing research into AGI.
3.1. Do nothing
3.1.1. AI is too distant to be worth our attention. One response
is that, although AGI is possible in principle, there is no
reason to expect it in the near future. Typically, this response
arises from the belief that, although there have been great
strides in narrow AI, researchers are still very far from
understanding how to build AGI. Distinguished computer
scientists such as Gordon Bell and Gordon Moore, as well as
cognitive scientists such as Douglas Hofstadter and Steven
Pinker, have expressed the opinion that the advent of AGI is
remote [6]. Davis [80] reviews some of the ways in which
computers are still far from human capabilities. Bringsjord
[58] even claim that a belief in AGI this century is fideistic,
appropriate within the realm of religion but not within science
or engineering.
Some writers also actively criticize any discussion of
AGI risk in the first place. The philosopher Alfred Nordmann
[208, 209] holds the view that ethical concern is a scarce
resource, not to be wasted on unlikely future scenarios such as
AGI. Likewise, Dennett [86] considers AGI risk an
‘imprudent pastime’ because it distracts our attention from
more immediate threats.
Others think that AGI is far off and not yet a major
concern, but admit that it might be valuable to give the issue
some attention. A presidential panel of the Association for the
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence considering the long-
term future of AI concluded that there was overall skepticism
about AGI risk, but that additional research into the topic and
related subjects would be valuable [156]. Posner [220] writes
that dedicated efforts for addressing the problem can wait, but
that we should gather more information about the problem in
the meanwhile.
The potential negative consequences of AGI are
enormous, ranging from economic instability to human
extinction. ‘Do nothing’ could be a reasonable course of
action if near-term AGI seemed extremely unlikely, if it
seemed too early for any proposals to be effective in reducing
risk, or if those proposals seemed too expensive to implement.
As a comparison, asteroid impact prevention is generally
considered a topic worth studying, even though the
probability of a civilization-threatening asteroid impact in
the near future is not considered high. Napier [202] discusses
several ways of estimating the frequency of such impacts.
Many models produce a rate of one civilization-threatening
impact per five hundred thousand or more years, though some
models suggest that rates of one such impact per hundred
thousand years cannot be excluded.
An estimate of one impact per hundred thousand years
would suggest less than a 0.1% chance of a civilization-
threatening impact within the next hundred years. The
probability of AGI being developed within the same period
seems considerably higher [200] and there is likewise a
reasonable chance of a hard takeoff after it has been
developed [309, 310], suggesting that the topic is at the very
least worth studying. Even without a hard takeoff society is
becoming increasingly automated and even narrow AI is
starting to require ethical guidelines [26, 282].
We know neither which fields of science will be needed
nor how much progress in them will be necessary for safe
AGI. If much progress is needed and we believe effective
progress to be possible this early on, it becomes reasonable to
start studying the topic even before AGI is near. Muehlhauser
[199] suggest that, for one safe AGI approach alone (value
learning, discussed further in section 5), efforts by AGI
researchers, economists, mathematicians and philosophers
may be needed. Safe AI may require the solutions for some of
these problems to come well before AGI is developed.
3.1.2. Little risk, no action needed. Some authors accept that
a form of AGI will probably be developed but do not consider
autonomous AGI to be a risk, or consider the possible
negative consequences acceptable. Bryson [61] argue that,
although AGI will require us to consider ethical and social
dangers, the dangers will be no worse than those of other
technologies. Whitby [298] writes that there has historically
been no consistent trend of the most intelligent people
acquiring the most authority and that computers will augment
humans rather than replace them. Whitby [299] further argue
that AGIs will not have any particular motivation to act
against us. Jenkins [159] agrees with these points to the extent
of saying that a machine will only act against humans if it is
programmed to value itself over humans, although she does
find AGI to be a real concern.
Another kind of ‘no action needed’ response argues that
AGI development will take a long time [59], implying that
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there will be plenty of time to deal with the issue later on.
This can also be taken as an argument for later efforts being
more effective, as they will be better tuned to AGI as it
develops.
Others argue that superintelligence will not be possible at
all20. McDermott [182] points out that there are no good
examples of algorithms which could be improved upon
indefinitely. Deutsch [87] argues that there will never be
superintelligent AGIs, because human minds are already
universal reasoners and computers can at best speed up the
experimental work that is required for testing and fine-tuning
theories. He also suggests that even as the speed of
technological development increases, so will our ability to
deal with change. Anderson [22] likewise suggests that the
inherent unpredictability of the world will place upper limits
on an entityʼs effective intelligence.
Heylighen [145] argues that a single, stand-alone
computer is exceedingly unlikely to become superintelligent
and that individual intelligences are always outmatched by the
distributed intelligence found in social systems of many
minds. Superintelligence will be achieved by building
systems that integrate and improve the ‘global brain’, the
collective intelligence of everyone on Earth. Heylighen does
acknowledge that this kind of a transition will pose its own
challenges, but not of the kind usually evoked in discussions
of AGI risk.
The idea of AGIs not having a motivation to act against
humans is intuitively appealing, but there seem to be strong
theoretical arguments against it. As mentioned earlier,
Omohundro [211, 212] and Bostrom [51] argue that self-
replication and the acquisition of resources are useful in the
pursuit of many different kinds of goals and that many types
of AI systems will therefore exhibit tendencies toward
behaviors such as breaking into other machines, self-
replicating and acquiring resources without regard for anyone
elseʼs safety. The right design might make it possible to
partially work around these behaviors [243, 287], but they
still need to be taken into account. Furthermore, we might not
foresee all the complex interactions of different AGI
mechanisms in the systems that we build and they may end
up with very different goals than the ones we intended
[88, 229, 309, 312].
Can AGIs become superintelligent? First, we note that
AGIs do not necessarily need to be much more intelligent
than humans in order to be dangerous. AGIs already enjoy
advantages such as the ability to rapidly expand their
population by having themselves copied [133, 136, 253],
which may confer on them considerable economic and
political influence even if they were not superintelligent. A
better-than-human ability to coordinate their actions, which
AGIs of a similar design could plausibly have [253], might
then be enough to tilt the odds in their favor.
Another consideration is that AGIs do not necessarily
need to be qualitatively more intelligent than humans in order
to outperform humans. An AGI that merely thought twice as
fast as any single human could still defeat him at intellectual
tasks that had a time constraint, all else equal. Here an
‘intellectual’ task should be interpreted broadly to refer not
only to ‘book smarts’ but to any task that animals cannot
perform due to their mental limitations—including tasks
involving social skills [309]. Straightforward improvements
in computing power could provide AGIs with a considerable
advantage in speed [72, 158, 251, 253, 306], which the AGI
could then use to study and accumulate experiences that
improved its skills.
As for Heylighenʼs [145] ‘global brain’ argument, there
does not seem to be a reason to presume that powerful AGIs
could not be geographically distributed, or that they could not
seize control of much of the Internet. Even if individual minds
were not very smart and needed a society to make progress,
for minds that are capable of copying themselves and
communicating perfectly with each other, individual instances
of the mind might be better understood as parts of a whole
than as separate individuals [253, 254]. In general, the
distinction between an individual and a community might not
be meaningful for AGIs [115]. If there were enough AGIs,
they might be able to form a community sufficient to take
control of the rest of the Earth. Heylighen [144] himself has
argued that many of the features of the Internet are virtually
identical to the mechanisms used by the human brain. If the
AGI is not carefully controlled, it might end up in a position
where it made up the majority of the ‘global brain’ and could
undertake actions which the remaining parts of the organism
did not agree with.
3.1.3. Let them kill us. Dietrich [89] argues that humanity
frequently harms other species and that people have also
evolved to hurt other people by engaging in behaviors such as
child abuse, sexism, rape and racism. Therefore, human
extinction would not matter, as long as the machines
implemented only the positive aspects of humanity.
De Garis [82] suggests that AGIs destroying humanity
might not matter. He writes that on a cosmic scale, with
hundreds of billions of stars in our galaxy alone, the survival
of the inhabitants of a single planet is irrelevant. As AGIs
would be more intelligent than us in every way, it would be
better if they replaced humanity.
AGIs being more intelligent and therefore more valuable
than humans equates intelligence with value, but Bostrom
[49] suggests ways by which a civilization of highly
intelligent entities might lack things which we thought to
have value. For example, such entities might not be conscious
in the first place. Alternatively, there are many things which
we consider valuable for their own sake, such as humor, love,
game-playing, art, sex, dancing, social conversation, philo-
sophy, literature, scientific discovery, food and drink, friend-
ship, parenting, and sport. We value these due to the fact that
we have dispositions and preferences which have been
evolutionarily adaptive in the past, but for a future civilization
20 The opposite argument is that superior intelligence will inevitably lead to
more moral behavior. Some of the arguments related to this position are
discussed in the context of evolutionary invariants (section 5.3.1), although
the authors advocating the use of evolutionary invariants do believe AGI risk
to be worth our concern.
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few or none of them might be, creating a world with very little
of value. Bostrom [51] proposes an orthogonality thesis, by
which an artificial intelligence can have any combination of
intelligence level and goal, including goals that humans
would intuitively deem to be of no value.
3.1.4. ‘Do nothing’ proposals: our view. As discussed above,
completely ignoring the possibility of AGI risk at this stage
would seem to require a confident belief in at least one of the
following propositions.
1. AGI is very remote.
2. There is no major risk from AGI even if it is created.
3. Very little effective work can be done at this stage.
4. AGIs destroying humanity would not matter.
In the beginning of this paper, we mentioned several experts
who considered it plausible that AGI might be created in the
next twenty to one hundred years; in this section we have
covered experts who disagree.
In general, there is a great deal of disagreement among
people who have made AGI predictions, and no clear
consensus even among experts in the field of artificial
intelligence. The lack of expert agreement suggests that
expertise in the field does not contribute to an ability to make
reliable predictions21. If the judgment of experts is not
reliable, then, probably, neither is anyone elseʼs. This
suggests that it is unjustified to be highly certain of AGI
being near, but also of it not being near. We thus consider it
unreasonable to have a confident belief in the first
proposition.
The second proposition also seems questionable: as
discussed in sections 2.1, 2.3 and 3.1.2, AGIs seem very
likely to obtain great power, possibly very quickly.
Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.2, the complexity
and fragility of value theses imply that it could be very
difficult to create AGIs which would not cause immense
amounts of damage if they had enough power.
It also does not seem like it is too early to work on the
problem: as we summarize in section 6, there seem to be a
number of promising research directions which can already be
pursued. We also agree with Yudkowsky [309], who points
out that research on the philosophical and technical require-
ments of safe AGI might show that broad classes of possible
AGI architectures are fundamentally unsafe, suggesting that
such architectures should be avoided. If this is the case, it
seems better to have that knowledge as early as possible,
before there has been a great deal of investment into unsafe
AGI designs.
In response to the suggestion that humanity being
destroyed would not matter, we certainly agree that there is
much to be improved in todayʼs humanity, and that our future
descendants might have very little resemblance to ourselves.
Regardless, we think that much about todayʼs humans is
valuable and worth preserving, and that we should be able to
preserve it without involving the death of present humans.
3.2. Integrate with society
Integration proposals hold that AGI might be created in the
next several decades and that there are indeed risks involved.
These proposals argue that the best way to deal with the
problem is to make sure that our societal structures are
equipped to handle AGIs once they are created.
There has been some initial work toward integrating
AGIs with existing legal and social frameworks, such as
considering questions of their legal position
[31, 62, 132, 174, 252, 296, 297] and moral rights
[62, 125, 175, 260, 261, 291].
3.2.1. Legal and economic controls. Hanson [138] writes
that the values of older and younger generations have often
been in conflict with each other and he compares this to a
conflict between humans and AGIs. He believes that the best
way to control AGI risk is to create a legal framework such
that it is in the interest of both humans and AGIs to uphold it.
Hanson [137] suggests that if the best way for AGIs to get
what they want is via mutually agreeable exchanges, then
humans would need to care less about what the AGIs wanted.
According to him, we should be primarily concerned with
ensuring that the AGIs will be law-abiding enough to respect
our property rights. Miller [189] summarizes Hansonʼs
argument and the idea that humanity could be content with
a small fraction of the worldʼs overall wealth and let the AGIs
have the rest. An analogy to this idea is that humans do not
kill people who become old enough to no longer contribute to
production, even though younger people could in principle
join together and take the wealth of the older people. Instead,
old people are allowed to keep their wealth even while in
retirement. If things went well, AGIs might similarly allow
humanity to ‘retire’ and keep its accumulated wealth, even if
humans were no longer otherwise useful for AGIs.
Hall [128] also says that we should ensure that the
interactions between ourselves and machines are economic,
‘based on universal rules of property and reciprocity’.
Moravec [196] likewise writes that governmental controls
should be used to ensure that humans benefit from AGIs.
Without government intervention, humans would be squeezed
out of existence by more efficient robots, but taxation could
be used to support human populations for a long time. He also
recommends laws which would require any AGIs to
incorporate programming that made them safe and subservi-
ent to human desires. Sandberg [232] writes that relying only
on legal and economic controls would be problematic, but
that a strategy which also incorporated them in addition to
other approaches would be more robust than a strategy which
did not.
However, even if AGIs were integrated with human
institutions, it does not guarantee that human values would
survive. If humans were reduced to a position of negligible
power, AGIs might not have any reason to keep us around.
21 Armstrong [29] point out that many of the task properties which have
been found to be conducive for developing reliable and useful expertise are
missing in AGI timeline forecasting. In particular, one of the most important
factors is whether experts get rapid (preferably immediate) feedback, while a
timeline prediction that is set many decades in the future might have been
entirely forgotten by the time that its correctness could be evaluated.
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Economic arguments, such as the principle of compara-
tive advantage, are sometimes invoked to argue that AGI
would find it more beneficial to trade with us than to do us
harm. However, technological progress can drive the wages
of workers below the level needed for survival
[60, 74, 100, 189] and there is already a possible threat of
technological unemployment [60]. AGIs keeping humans
around due to gains from trade implicitly presumes that they
would not have the will or the opportunity to simply eliminate
humans in order to replace them with a better trading partner
and then trade with the new partner instead.
Humans already eliminate species with low economic
value in order to make room for more humans, such as when
clearing a forest in order to build new homes. Clark uses the
example of horses in Britain: their population peaked in 1901,
with 3.25 million horses doing work such as plowing fields,
hauling wagons and carriages short distances, and carrying
armies into battle. The internal combustion engine replaced so
many of them that by 1924 there were fewer than two million.
Clark writes:
There was always a wage at which all these
horses could have remained employed. But
that wage was so low that it did not pay for
their feed, and it certainly did not pay enough
to breed fresh generations of horses to replace
them. Horses were thus an early casualty of
industrialization [74].
There are also ways to harm humans while still
respecting their property rights, such as by manipulating
them into making bad decisions, or selling them addictive
substances. If AGIs were sufficiently smarter than humans,
humans could be tricked into making a series of trades that
respected their property rights but left them with negligible
assets and caused considerable damage to their well-being.
A related issue is that AGIs might become more capable
of changing our values than we are capable of changing AGI
values. Mass media already convey values that have a
negative impact on human well-being, such as idealization of
rare body types, which causes dissatisfaction among people
who do not have those kinds of bodies [12, 122]. AGIs with a
deep understanding of human psychology could engineer the
spread of values which shifted more power to them,
regardless of their effect on human well-being.
Yet another problem is ensuring that the AGIs have
indeed adopted the right values. Making intelligent beings
adopt specific values is a difficult process which often fails.
There could be an AGI with the wrong goals that would
pretend to behave correctly in society throughout the whole
socialization process. AGIs could conceivably preserve and
conceal their goals far better than humans could.
Society does not know of any methods which would
reliably instill our chosen values in human minds, despite a
long history of trying to develop them. Our attempts to make
AGIs adopt human values would be hampered by our lack of
experience and understanding of the AGIʼs thought processes,
with even tried-and-true methods for instilling positive values
in humans possibly being ineffective. The limited success that
we do have with humans is often backed up by various
incentives as well as threats of punishment, both of which
might fail in the case of an AGI developing to become vastly
more powerful than us.
Additionally, the values which a being is likely to adopt,
or is even capable of adopting, will depend on its mental
architecture. We will demonstrate these claims with examples
from humans, who are not blank slates on whom arbitrary
values can be imposed with the right education [218].
Although the challenge of instilling specific values in humans
is very different from the challenge of instilling them in AGIs,
our examples are meant to demonstrate the fact that the
existing properties of a mind will affect the process of
acquiring values. Just as it is difficult to make humans
permanently adopt some kinds of values, the kind of mental
architecture that an AGI has will affect its inclination to adopt
various values.
Psychopathy is a risk factor for violence and psycho-
pathic criminals are much more likely to re-offend than non-
psychopaths [139]. Harris [140] argue that therapy for
psychopaths is ineffective22 and may even make them more
dangerous, as they use their improved social skills to
manipulate others more effectively. Furthermore, ‘cult
brainwashing’ is generally ineffective and most cult members
will eventually leave [25] and large-scale social engineering
efforts often face widespread resistance, even in dictatorships
with few scruples about which methods to use [chapters 6 and
7 [238]]. Thus, while one can try to make humans adopt
values, this will only work to the extent that the individuals in
question are actually disposed toward adopting them.
3.2.2. Foster positive values. Kurzweil [170], considering
the possible effects of many future technologies, notes that
AGI may be a catastrophic risk. He generally supports
regulation and partial relinquishment of dangerous
technologies, as well as research into their defensive
applications. However, he believes that with AGI this may
be insufficient and that, at the present time, it may be
infeasible to develop strategies that would guarantee safe
AGI. He argues that machine intelligences will be tightly
integrated into our society and that, for the time being, the
best chance of avoiding AGI risk is to foster positive values in
our society. This will increase the likelihood that any AGIs
that are created will reflect such positive values.
One possible way of achieving such a goal is moral
enhancement [91], the use of technology to instill people with
better motives. Persson [215, 216] argue that, as technology
improves, we become more capable of damaging humanity,
and that we need to carry out moral enhancement in order to
lessen our destructive impulses.
3.2.3. ‘Integrate with society’ proposals: our view. Proposals
to incorporate AGIs into society suffer from the issue that
some AGIs may never adopt benevolent and cooperative
values, no matter what the environment. Neither does the
intelligence of the AGIs necessarily affect their values [51].
22 Salekin [230] offers a more optimistic opinion.
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Sufficiently intelligent AGIs could certainly come to
eventually understand human values, but humans can also
come to understand others’ values while continuing to
disagree with them.
Thus, in order for these kinds of proposals to work, they
need to incorporate strong enforcement mechanisms to keep
non-safe AGIs in line and to prevent them from acquiring
significant power. This requires an ability to create value-
conforming AGIs in the first place, to implement the
enforcement. Even a soft takeoff would eventually lead to
AGIs wielding great power, so the enforcement could not be
left to just humans or narrow AIs23. In practice, this means
that integration proposals must be combined with some
proposal for internal constraints which is capable of reliably
creating value-conforming AGIs. Integration proposals also
require there to be a soft takeoff in order to work, as having a
small group of AGIs which rapidly acquired enough power to
take control of the world would prevent any gradual
integration schemes from working.
Therefore, because any effective integration strategy
would require creating safe AGIs, and the right safe AGI
design could lead to a positive outcome even if there were a
hard takeoff, we believe that it is currently better to focus on
proposals which are aimed at furthering the creation of
safe AGIs.
3.3. Regulate research
Integrating AGIs into society may require explicit regulation.
Calls for regulation are often agnostic about long-term out-
comes but nonetheless recommend caution as a reasonable
approach. For example, Hibbard [147] calls for international
regulation to ensure that AGIs will value the long-term well-
being of humans, but does not go into much detail. Daley [79]
calls for a government panel for AGI issues. Hughes [157]
argues that AGI should be regulated using the same
mechanisms as previous technologies, creating state agencies
responsible for the task and fostering global cooperation in
the regulation effort24.
Current mainstream academic opinion does not consider
AGI a serious threat [156], so AGI regulation seems unlikely
in the near future. On the other hand, many AI systems are
becoming increasingly autonomous and a number of authors
are arguing that even narrow-AI applications should be
equipped with an understanding of ethics [282]. Currently
there are calls to regulate AI in the form of high-frequency
trading (HFT) [250] and AI applications that have a major
impact on society might become increasingly regulated. At
the same time, legislation has a well-known tendency to lag
behind technology and regulating AI applications will prob-
ably not translate into regulating basic research into AGI.
3.3.1. Review boards. Yampolskiy [305] note that university
research programs in the social and medical sciences are
overseen by institutional review boards. They propose setting
up analogous review boards to evaluate potential AGI
research. Research that was found to be AGI related would
be restricted with measures ranging from supervision and
funding limits to partial or complete bans. At the same time,
research focusing on safety measures would be encouraged.
Posner [p 221, 220] suggests the enactment of a law
which would require scientific research projects in dangerous
areas to be reviewed by a federal catastrophic risks
assessment board and forbidden if the board found that the
project would create an undue risk to human survival.
Wilson [301] makes possibly the most detailed AGI
regulation proposal so far, recommending a new international
treaty where a body of experts would determine whether there
was a ‘reasonable level of concern’ about AGI or some other
possibly dangerous research. States would be required to
regulate research or even temporarily prohibit it once experts
agreed upon there being such a level of concern. He also
suggests a number of other safeguards built into the treaty,
such as the creation of ethical oversight organizations for
researchers, mechanisms for monitoring abuses of dangerous
technologies and an oversight mechanism for scientific
publications.
3.3.2. Encourage research into safe AGI. In contrast,
McGinnis [183] argues that the government should not
attempt to regulate AGI development. Rather, it should
concentrate on providing funding for research projects
intended to create safe AGI.
Goertzel [115] argue for an open-source approach to safe
AGI development instead of regulation. Hibbard [149] has
likewise suggested developing AGI via open-source methods,
but not as an alternative to regulation.
Legg [172] proposes funding safe AGI research via an
organization that takes a venture capitalist approach to
funding research teams, backing promising groups and
cutting funding to any teams that fail to make significant
progress. The focus of the funding would be to make AGI as
safe as possible.
3.3.3. Differential technological progress. Both review
boards and government funding could be used to implement
‘differential intellectual progress’:
Differential intellectual progress consists in
prioritizing risk-reducing intellectual progress
over risk-increasing intellectual progress. As
applied to AI risks in particular, a plan of
differential intellectual progress would
recommend that our progress on the scientific,
philosophical and technological problems of
AI safety outpace our progress on the pro-
blems of AI capability such that we develop
safe superhuman AIs before we develop
(arbitrary) superhuman AIs [200].
23 For proposals which suggest that humans could use technology to remain
competitive with AGIs and thus prevent them from acquiring excessive
amounts of power, see section 3.4.
24 Some of these proposals are written in the context of the USA and refer to
the actions that the US government should take, but the general logic behind
the proposals is not US-specific.
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Examples of research questions that could constitute
philosophical or scientific progress in safety can be found in
later sections of this paper—for instance, the usefulness of
different internal constraints on ensuring safe behavior, or
ways of making AGIs reliably adopt human values as they
learn what those values are like.
Earlier, Bostrom [47] used the term ‘differential
technological progress’ to refer to differential intellectual
progress in technological development. Bostrom defined
differential technological progress as ‘trying to retard the
implementation of dangerous technologies and accelerate
implementation of beneficial technologies, especially those
that ameliorate the hazards posed by other technologies’.
One issue with differential technological progress is that
we do not know what kind of progress should be accelerated
and what should be retarded. For example, a more advanced
communication infrastructure could make AGIs more danger-
ous, as there would be more networked machines that could
be accessed via the Internet. Alternatively, it could be that the
world will already be so networked that AGIs will be a major
threat anyway and further advances will make the networks
more resilient to attack. Similarly, it can be argued that AGI
development is dangerous for as long as we have yet to solve
the philosophical problems related to safe AGI design and do
not know which AGI architectures are safe to pursue [309].
But it can also be argued that we should invest in AGI
development now, when the related tools and hardware are
still primitive enough that progress will be slow and
gradual [115].
3.3.4. International mass surveillance. For AGI regulation to
work, it needs to be enacted on a global scale. This requires
solving both the problem of effectively enforcing regulation
within a country and the problem of getting many different
nations to all agree on the need for regulation.
Shulman [241] discusses various factors influencing the
difficulty of AGI arms control. He notes that AGI technology
itself might make international cooperation more feasible. If
narrow AIs and early-stage AGIs were used to analyze the
information obtained from wide-scale mass surveillance and
wiretapping, this might make it easier to ensure that nobody
was developing more advanced AGI designs.
Shulman [242] similarly notes that machine intelligences
could be used to enforce treaties between nations. They could
also act as trustworthy inspectors which would be restricted to
communicating only information about treaty violations, thus
not endangering state secrets even if they were allowed
unlimited access to them. This could help establish a
‘singleton’ [48] regulatory regimen capable of effectively
enforcing international regulation, including AGI-related
treaties. Goertzel [115] also discuss the possibility of having
a network of AGIs monitoring the world in order to police
other AGIs and to prevent any of them from suddenly
obtaining excessive power.
Another proposal for international mass surveillance is to
build an ‘AGI Nanny’ [111, 115], a proposal discussed in
section 5.4.
Large-scale surveillance efforts are ethically problematic
and face major political resistance, and it seems unlikely that
current political opinion would support the creation of a far-
reaching surveillance network for the sake of AGI risk alone.
The extent to which such extremes would be necessary
depends on exactly how easy it would be to develop AGI in
secret. Although several authors make the point that AGI is
much easier to develop unnoticed than something like nuclear
weapons [183, 189], cutting-edge high-tech research does
tend to require major investments which might plausibly be
detected even by less elaborate surveillance efforts.
To the extent that surveillance does turn out to be
necessary, there is already a strong trend toward a
‘surveillance society’ with increasing amounts of information
about people being collected and recorded in various
databases [9]. As a reaction to the increased surveillance,
Mann et al [179] propose to counter it with sousveillance—
giving private individuals the ability to document their life
and subject the authorities to surveillance in order to protect
civil liberties. This is similar to the proposals of Brin [57],
who argues that technological progress might eventually lead
to a ‘transparent society’, where we will need to redesign our
societal institutions in a way that allows us to maintain some
of our privacy despite omnipresent surveillance. Miller [189]
notes that intelligence agencies are already making major
investments in AI-assisted analysis of surveillance data.
If social and technological developments independently
create an environment where large-scale surveillance or
sousveillance is commonplace, it might be possible to take
advantage of those developments in order to police AGI
risk25. Walker [279] argues that in order for mass surveillance
to become effective, it must be designed in such a way that it
will not excessively violate peopleʼs privacy, for otherwise
the system will face widespread sabotage26. Even under such
conditions, there is no clear way to define what counts as
dangerous AGI. Goertzel [115] point out that there is no clear
division between narrow AI and AGI and attempts to
establish such criteria have failed. They argue that since
AGI has a nebulous definition, obvious wide-ranging
economic benefits and potentially significant penetration into
multiple industry sectors, it is unlikely to be regulated due to
speculative long-term risks.
AGI regulation requires global cooperation, as the non-
cooperation of even a single nation might lead to catastrophe.
Historically, achieving global cooperation on tasks such as
25 An added benefit would be that this could also help avoid other kinds of
existential risks, such as the intentional creation of dangerous new diseases.
26 Walker also suggests that surveillance systems could be designed to
automatically edit out privacy-endangering details (such as pictures of
people) from the data that they transmit, while leaving in details which might
help in revealing dangerous ploys (such as pictures of bombs). However, this
seems impossible to implement effectively, as research has found ways to
extract personally identifying information and details from a wide variety of
supposedly anonymous datasets [66, 95, 116, 203, 204, 206, 263]. Narayanan
[205] even go as far as to state that ‘the false dichotomy between personally
identifiable and non-personally identifiable information should disappear
from privacy policies, laws, etc. Any aspect of an individualʼs … personality
can be used for de-anonymization, and this reality should be recognized by
the relevant legislation and corporate privacy policies’.
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nuclear disarmament and climate change has been very
difficult. As with nuclear weapons, AGI could give an
immense economic and military advantage to the country that
develops it first, in which case limiting AGI research might
even give other countries an incentive to develop AGI faster
[65, 82, 183, 189].
To be effective, regulation also needs to enjoy support
among those being regulated. If developers working in AGI-
related fields only follow the letter of the law, while privately
viewing all regulations as annoying hindrances, and fears
about AGI as overblown, the regulations may prove
ineffective. Thus, it might not be enough to convince
governments of the need for regulation; the much larger
group of people working in the appropriate fields may also
need to be convinced.
While Shulman [241] argues that the unprecedentedly
destabilizing effect of AGI could be a cause for world leaders
to cooperate more than usual, the opposite argument can be
made as well. Gubrud [124] argues that increased automation
could make countries more self-reliant and international
cooperation considerably more difficult. AGI technology is
also much harder to detect than, for example, nuclear
technology is—nuclear weapons require a substantial infra-
structure to develop, while AGI needs much less [183, 189].
Miller [189] even suggests that the mere possibility of a
rival being close to developing AGI might, if taken seriously,
trigger a nuclear war. The nation that was losing the AGI race
might think that being the first to develop AGI was
sufficiently valuable that it was worth launching a first strike
for, even if it would lose most of its own population in the
retaliatory attack. He further argues that, although it would be
in the interest of every nation to try to avoid such an outcome,
the ease of secretly pursuing an AGI development program
undetected, in violation of treaty, could cause most nations to
violate the treaty.
Miller also points out that the potential for an AGI arms
race exists not only between nations, but between corpora-
tions as well. He notes that the more AGI developers there
are, the more likely it is that they will all take more risks, with
each AGI developer reasoning that if they do not take this
risk, somebody else might take that risk first.
Goertzel [115] suggest that for regulation to be enacted,
there might need to be an ‘AGI Sputnik’—a technological
achievement that makes the possibility of AGI evident to the
public and policy makers. They note that after such a
moment, it might not take very long for full human-level AGI
to be developed, while the negotiations required to enact
new kinds of arms control treaties would take considerably
longer.
So far, the discussion has assumed that regulation would
be carried out effectively and in the pursuit of humanityʼs
common interests, but actual legislation is strongly affected
by lobbying and the desires of interest groups [210]
Mueller:2003. Many established interest groups would have
an economic interest in either furthering or retarding AGI
development, rendering the success of regulation uncertain.
3.3.5. ‘Regulate research’ proposals: our view. Although
there seem to be great difficulties involved with regulation,
there also remains the fact that many technologies have been
successfully subjected to international regulation. Even if one
were skeptical about the chances of effective regulation, an
AGI arms race seems to be one of the worst possible
scenarios, one which should be avoided if at all possible. We
are therefore generally supportive of regulation, though the
most effective regulatory approach remains unclear.
3.4. Enhance human capabilities
While regulation approaches attempt to limit the kinds of
AGIs that will be created, enhancement approaches attempt to
give humanity and AGIs a level playing field. In principle,
gains in AGI capability would not be a problem if humans
could improve themselves to the same level.
Alternatively, human capabilities could be improved in
order to obtain a more general capability to deal with difficult
problems. Verdoux [275, 276] suggests that cognitive
enhancement could help in transforming previously incom-
prehensible mysteries into tractable problems and Verdoux
[275] in particular highlights the possibility of cognitive
enhancement helping to deal with the problems posed by
existential risks. One problem with such approaches is that
increasing humanityʼs capability for solving problems will
also make it easier to develop dangerous technologies. It is
possible that cognitive enhancement should be combined with
moral enhancement, in order to help foster the kind of
cooperation that would help avoid the risks of technology
[215, 216].
Moravec [193, 196] proposes that humans could keep up
with AGIs via ‘mind uploading’, a process of transferring the
information in human brains to computer systems so that
human minds could run on a computer substrate. This tech-
nology may arrive during a similar timeframe as AGI
[69, 143, 165, 170, 233, 234, 254]. However, Moravec argues
that mind uploading would come after AGIs, and that unless
the uploaded minds (‘uploads’) would transform themselves
to become radically non-human, they would be weaker and
less competitive than AGIs that were native to a digital
environment [194, 196]. For these reasons,Warwick [289]
also expresses doubt about the usefulness of mind
uploading27.
Kurzweil [170] posits an evolution that will start with
brain–computer interfaces, then proceed to using brain-
embedded nanobots to enhance our intelligence and finally
lead to full uploading and radical intelligence enhancement.
Koene [166] criticizes plans to create safe AGIs and considers
uploading both a more feasible and a more reliable approach.
27 Some uploading approaches also raise questions of personal identity,
whether the upload would still be the same person as the original
[38, 45, 72, 112, 142, 155, 193, 262, 280] and whether they would be
conscious in the first place [11, 71, 142, 169, 239]. However, these concerns
are not necessarily very relevant for AGI risk considerations, as a population
of uploads working to protect against AGIs would be helpful even if they
lacked consciousness or were different individuals than the originals.
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Similar proposals have also been made without explicitly
mentioning mind uploading. Cade [65] speculates on the
option of gradually merging with machines by replacing body
parts with mechanical components. Turney [270] proposes
linking AGIs directly to human brains so that the two meld
together into one entity and Warwick [289, 290] notes that
cyborgization could be used to enhance humans.
Mind uploading might also be used to make human value
systems more accessible and easy to learn for AGIs, such as
by having an AGI extrapolate the uploadʼs goals directly from
its brain, with the upload providing feedback.
3.4.1. Would we remain human? Uploading might destroy
parts of humanity that we value [82, 160]. De Garis [82]
argues that a computer could have far more processing power
than a human brain, making it pointless to merge computers
and humans. The biological component of the resulting
hybrid would be insignificant compared to the electronic
component, creating a mind that was negligibly different from
a ‘pure’ AGI. Kurzweil [168] makes the same argument,
saying that although he supports intelligence enhancement by
directly connecting brains and computers, this would only
keep pace with AGIs for a couple of additional decades.
The truth of this claim seems to depend on exactly how
human brains are augmented. In principle, it seems possible to
create a prosthetic extension of a human brain that uses the
same basic architecture as the original brain and gradually
integrates with it [254]. A human extending their intelligence
using such a method might remain roughly human-like and
maintain their original values. However, it could also be
possible to connect brains with computer programs that are
very unlike human brains and which would substantially
change the way the original brain worked. Even smaller
differences could conceivably lead to the adoption of ‘cyborg
values’ distinct from ordinary human values [290].
Bostrom [49] speculates that humans might outsource
many of their skills to non-conscious external modules and
would cease to experience anything as a result. The value-
altering modules would provide substantial advantages to
their users, to the point that they could outcompete uploaded
minds who did not adopt the modules.
Uploading would also allow humans to make precise and
deep modifications to their own minds, which carries with it
dangers of a previously unencountered kind [259].
3.4.2. Would evolutionary pressures change us? A
willingness to integrate value-altering modules is not the
only way by which a population of uploads might come to
have very different values from modern-day humans. This is
not necessarily a bad, or even a very novel, development: the
values of earlier generations have often been different from
the values of later generations [138] and it might not be a
problem if a civilization of uploads enjoyed very different
things than a civilization of humans. Still, as there are
possible outcomes that we would consider catastrophic, such
as the loss of nearly all things that have intrinsic value for us
[49], it is worth reviewing some of the postulated changes in
values.
For comprehensiveness, we will summarize all of the
suggested effects that uploading might have on human values,
even if they are not obviously negative. Readers may decide
for themselves whether or not they consider any of these
effects to be causes for concern.
Hanson [133] argues that employers will want to copy
uploads who are good workers and that at least some uploads
will consent to being copied in such a manner. He suggests
that the resulting evolutionary dynamics would lead to an
accelerated evolution of values. This would cause most of the
upload population to evolve to be indifferent or favorable to
the thought of being copied, to be indifferent toward being
deleted as long as another copy of themselves remained and
to be relatively uninterested in having children ‘the traditional
way’ (as opposed to copying an already-existing mind).
Although Hansonʼs analysis uses the example of a worker–
employer relationship, it should be noted that nations or
families, or even single individuals, could also gain a
competitive advantage by copying themselves, thus contri-
buting to the strength of the evolutionary dynamic.
Similarly, Bostrom [49] writes that much of human lifeʼs
meaning depends on the enjoyment of things ranging from
humor and love to literature and parenting. These capabilities
were adaptive in our past, but in an upload environment they
might cease to be such and gradually disappear entirely.
Shulman [242] likewise considers uploading-related
evolutionary dynamics. He notes that there might be a strong
pressure for uploads to make copies of themselves in such a
way that individual copies would be ready to sacrifice
themselves to aid the rest. This would favor a willingness to
copy oneself and a view of personal identity which did not
consider the loss of a single copy to be death. Beings taking
this point of view could then take advantage of the economic
benefits of continually creating and deleting vast numbers of
minds depending on the conditions, favoring the existence of
a large number of short-lived copies over a somewhat less
efficient world of long-lived minds.
Finally, Sotala [254] consider the possibility of minds
coalescing via artificial connections that linked several brains
together in the same fashion as the two hemispheres of
ordinary brains are linked together. If this were to happen,
considerable benefits might accrue to those who were ready to
coalesce with other minds. The ability to copy and share
memories between minds might also blur distinctions
between individual minds. In the end, most humans might
cease to be individual, distinct people in any real sense of
the word.
It has also been proposed that information security
concerns could cause undesirable dynamics among uploads,
with significant advantages accruing to those who could steal
the computational resources of others and use them to create
new copies of themselves. If one could seize control of the
hardware that an upload was running on, it could be
immediately replaced with a copy of a mind loyal to the
attacker. It might even be possible to do this without being
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detected, if it was possible to steal enough of an uploadʼs
personal information to impersonate it.
An attack targeting a critical vulnerability in some
commonly used piece of software might quickly hit a very
large number of victims. As previously discussed in
section 2.3.1, both theoretical arguments and actual cases of
malware show that large numbers of machines on the Internet
could be infected in a very short time [191, 192, 257]. In a
society of uploads, attacks such as these would be not only
inconvenient, but potentially fatal. Eckersley [93] offer a
preliminary analysis of information security in a world of
uploads.
3.4.3. Would uploading help? Even if the potential changes
of values were deemed acceptable, it is unclear whether the
technology for uploading could be developed before
developing AGI. Uploading might require emulating the
low-level details of a human brain with a high degree of
precision, requiring large amounts of computing power
[69, 234]. In contrast, an AGI might be designed around
high-level principles which have been chosen to be
computationally cheap to implement on existing hardware
architectures.
Yudkowsky [309] uses the analogy that it is much easier
to figure out the principles of aerodynamic flight and then
build a Boeing 747 than it is to take a living bird and
‘upgrade’ it into a giant bird that can carry passengers, all
while ensuring that the bird remains alive and healthy
throughout the process. Likewise, it may be much easier to
figure out the basic principles of intelligence and build AGIs
than to upload existing minds.
On the other hand, one can also construct an analogy
suggesting that it is easier to copy a thingʼs function than it is
to understand how it works. If a person does not understand
architecture but wants to build a sturdy house, it may be easier
to create a replica of an existing house than it is to design an
entirely new one that does not collapse.
Even if uploads were created first, they might not be able
to harness all the advantages of digitality, as many of these
advantages depend on minds being easy to modify [253],
which human minds may not be. Uploads will be able to
directly edit their source code as well as introduce simulated
pharmaceutical and other interventions, and they could
experiment on copies that are restored to an unmodified state
if the modifications turn out to be unworkable [242].
Regardless, human brains did not evolve to be easy to
modify and it may be difficult to find a workable set of
modifications which would drastically improve them.
In contrast, in order for an AGI programmed using
traditional means to be manageable as a software project, it
must be easy for the engineers to modify it28. Thus, even if
uploading were developed before AGI, AGIs that were
developed later might still be capable of becoming more
powerful than uploads. However, existing uploads already
enjoying some of the advantages of the newly created AGIs
would still make it easier for the uploads to control the AGIs,
at least for a while.
Moravec [194] notes that the human mind has evolved to
function in an environment which is drastically different from
a purely digital environment and that the only way to remain
competitive with AGIs would be to transform into something
that was very different from a human. This suggests that
uploading might buy time for other approaches, but would be
only a short-term solution in and of itself.
If uploading technology were developed before AGI, it
could be used to upload a research team or other group and
run them at a vastly accelerated rate as compared to the rest of
humanity. This would give them a considerable amount of
extra time for developing any of the other approaches. If this
group were among the first to be successfully emulated and
sped up, and if the speed-up would allow enough subjective
time to pass before anyone else could implement their own
version, they might also be able to avoid trading safety for
speed. However, such a group might be able to wield
tremendous power, so they would need to be extremely
reliable and trustworthy.
3.4.4. ‘Enhance human capabilities’ proposals: our view. Of
the various ‘enhance human capabilities’ approaches,
uploading proposals seem the most promising, as translating
a human brain to a computer program would sidestep many of
the constraints that come from modifying a physical system.
For example, all relevant brain activity could be recorded for
further analysis at an arbitrary level of detail and any part of
the brain could be instantly modified without a need for time-
consuming and possibly dangerous invasive surgery.
Uploaded brains could also be more easily upgraded to take
full advantage of more powerful hardware, while humans
whose brains were still partially biological would be
bottlenecked by the speed of the biological component.
Uploading does have several problems: uploading
research might lead to AGI being created before the uploads,
in the long term uploads might have unfavorable evolutionary
dynamics and it seems likely that there will eventually be
AGIs which are capable of outperforming uploads in every
field of competence. Uploads could also be untrustworthy
even without evolutionary dynamics. At the same time,
however, uploading research does not necessarily accelerate
AGI research very much, the evolutionary dynamics might
not be as bad as they seem at the moment and the advantages
gained from uploading might be enough to help control
unsafe AGIs until safe ones could be developed. Methods
could also be developed for increasing the trustworthiness of
uploads [242]. Uploading might still turn out to be a useful
tool for handling AGI risk.
3.5. Relinquish technology
Not everyone believes that the risks involved in creating AGIs
are acceptable. Relinquishment involves the abandonment of
technological development that could lead to AGI. This is
possibly the earliest proposed approach, with Butler [64]
writing that ‘war to the death should be instantly proclaimed’
28 However, this might not be true for AGIs created using some alternative
means, such as artificial life [260].
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upon machines, for otherwise they would end up destroying
humans entirely. In a much-discussed article, Joy [160] sug-
gests that it might be necessary to relinquish at least some
aspects of AGI research, as well as nanotechnology and
genetics research.
Hughes [157] criticizes AGI relinquishment, while
Kurzweil [170] criticizes broad relinquishment but supports
the possibility of ‘fine-grained relinquishment’, banning some
dangerous aspects of technologies while allowing general
work on them to proceed. In general, most writers reject
proposals for broad relinquishment.
3.5.1. Outlaw AGI. Weng et al [297] write that the creation
of AGIs would force society to shift from human-centric
values to robot–human dual values. In order to avoid this,
they consider the possibility of banning AGI. This could be
done either permanently or until appropriate solutions are
developed for mediating such a conflict of values.
McKibben [184], writing mainly in the context of genetic
engineering, suggests that AGI research should be stopped.
He brings up the historical examples of China renouncing
seafaring in the 1400 s and Japan relinquishing firearms in the
1600 s, as well as the more recent decisions to abandon DDT,
CFCs and genetically modified crops in Western countries.
However, it should also be noted that Japan participated in
World War II; that China now has a navy; that there are
reasonable alternatives for DDT and CFCs, which probably
do not exist for AGI; and that genetically modified crops are
in wide use in the United States.
Hughes [157] argues that attempts to outlaw a technology
will only make the technology move to other countries. He
also considers the historical relinquishment of biological
weapons to be a bad example, for no country has relinquished
peaceful biotechnological research such as the development
of vaccines, nor would it be desirable to do so. With AGI,
there would be no clear dividing line between safe and
dangerous research.
De Garis [82] believes that differences of opinion about
whether to build AGIs will eventually lead to armed conflict,
to the point of open warfare. Annas et al [24] have similarly
argued that genetic engineering of humans would eventually
lead to war between unmodified humans and the engineered
‘posthumans’, and that cloning and inheritable modifications
should therefore be banned. To the extent that one accepts
their reasoning with regard to humans, it could also be
interpreted to apply to AGIs.
3.5.2. Restrict hardware. Berglas [44] suggests not only
stopping AGI research, but also outlawing the production of
more powerful hardware. Berglas holds that it will be possible
to build computers as powerful as human brains in the very
near future and that we should therefore reduce the power of
new processors and destroy existing ones29. Branwen [56]
argues that Mooreʼs law depends on the existence of a small
number of expensive and centralized chip factories, making
them easy targets for regulation and incapable of being
developed in secret.
3.5.3. ‘Relinquish technology’ proposals: our view.
Relinquishment proposals suffer from many of the same
problems as regulation proposals, but to a greater extent.
There is no historical precedent of general, multi-use
technology similar to AGI being successfully relinquished
for good, nor do there seem to be any theoretical reasons for
believing that relinquishment proposals would work in the
future. Therefore we do not consider them to be a viable class
of proposals.
4. External AGI constraints
Societal approaches involving regulation or research into safe
AGI assume that proper AGI design can produce solutions to
AGI risks. One category of such solutions is that of external
constraints. These are restrictions that are imposed on an AGI
from the outside and aim to limit its ability to do damage.
Several authors have argued that external constraints are
unlikely to work with AGIs that are genuinely far more
intelligent than us [30, 72, 170, 278, 307, 309]. The con-
sensus seems to be that external constraints might buy time
when dealing with less advanced AGIs, but they are useless
against truly superintelligent ones.
External constraints also limit the usefulness of an AGI,
as a free-acting one could serve its creators more effectively.
This reduces the probability of the universal implementation
of external constraints on AGIs. AGIs might also be dan-
gerous if they were confined or otherwise restricted. For
further discussion of these points, see section 5.1.
4.1. AGI confinement
AGI confinement, or ‘AI boxing’ [30, 72, 92, 278, 303],
involves confining an AGI to a specific environment and
limiting its access to the external world.
Yampolskiy [303] makes an attempt to formalize the
idea, drawing on previous computer security research on the
so-called confinement problem [171]. Yampolskiy defines the
AI confinement problem as the challenge of restricting an AGI
to a confined environment from which it cannot communicate
without authorization. A number of methods have been pro-
posed for implementing AI confinement, many of which are
extensively discussed in Armstrong, Sandberg and Bostromʼs
[30] paper.
Chalmers [72] and Armstrong et al [30] mention
numerous caveats and difficulties with AI-boxing approaches.
A truly leakproof system that perfectly isolated the AGI from
an outside environment would prevent us from even obser-
ving the AGI. If AGIs were given knowledge about human
behavior or psychology, they could still launch social engi-
neering attacks on us [30, 72]. An AGI that was unaware of
the existence of humans would be less likely to launch such
29 Berglas (personal communication) has since changed his mind and no
longer believes that it is possible to effectively restrict hardware or otherwise
prevent AGI from being created.
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attacks, but also much more limited in the kinds of tasks that
it could be used for.
Even if the AGI remained confined, it could achieve
enough influence among humans to prevent itself from being
reset or otherwise modified [118]. An AGI that people grew
reliant on might also become impossible to reset or modify.
4.1.1. Safe questions. Yampolskiy [303] proposes a
hierarchy of security levels for communication with the
AGI, ranging from completely unrestricted communication to
no communication whatsoever. He suggests that the right
level for communicating with AGIs is an intermediate one,
based on asking ‘safe questions’. These are defined as
questions for which a human could find an answer without
help from a superintelligence. For instance, a researcher who
was considering two possible cures for cancer could ask the
AGI which one to pursue first. Yampolskiy argues that the
AGI is effectively not changing the final outcome, as the
researcher would in principle be capable of finding the better
treatment himself. The AGI, by recommending one of the
approaches as the choice to pursue first, is merely speeding up
the process. Armstrong et al [30] also briefly discuss such
approaches.
4.1.2. Virtual worlds. While the confinement protocol
supposes an AGI that can perceive our world directly,
Chalmers [72] uses the term ‘leakproof singularity’ to refer to
the project of creating isolated virtual worlds which would
disallow their inhabitants from influencing the external world.
An AGI placed in such a world could be monitored by
humans to ensure that it was safe to release into our world.
However, Chalmers notes that ‘for an AI system to be useful
or interesting to us at all, it must have some effects on us. At a
minimum, we must be able to observe it. And the moment we
observe a virtual environment, some information leaks out
from that environment into our environment and affects us’.
Hibbard [151] proposes a decision support system for
evaluating AGI designs in simulated environments that model
our real environment, and attempts to show that the AGI can
be built to be safe.
Armstrong et al [30] discuss the notion that we could
supplement this approach with several layers of ‘sub-worlds’:
virtual worlds stacked within each other. In such a scenario,
even if an AGI somehow manages to break out from one
virtual reality, it is still restricted by another and cannot
directly influence the world. Ultimately, the authors conclude
that this approach is not very promising.
4.1.3. Resetting the AGI. For as long as an AGI remains
confined or cooperative, its memory could be altered from the
outside. Turney [270] mentions a proposal in which an AGIʼs
memory could be wiped after each job, thus limiting its
potential. Armstrong et al [30] also mention the possibility of
resetting an AGI after each run, though they note that there
are many ways for the AGI to get around it and that it is only
useful for certain kinds of AGI systems.
Good [118] warns that a superhuman AGI may be smart
enough to find ways to prevent itself from being successfully
reset or shut down, including methods of social manipulation.
Warwick [289] makes a similar point.
4.1.4. Checks and balances. Armstrong et al [30] suggest a
number of checks and balances that could be used to catch the
early stages of an AGI that was behaving dangerously or
trying to deceive us. Test questions with known answers
could be mixed in with questions we genuinely did not know
the answer to, in order to establish an AGIʼs trustworthiness.
‘Honey-pots’, tempting resources with great value to the AGI,
could also be left in physical or mental locations that it was
forbidden from accessing. Finally, several different kinds of
AGIs could be presented with the same problem, with their
answers then being compared. Inconsistent answers would
suggest a possible attempt at deception.
4.1.5. ‘AI confinement’ proposals: our view. Despite their
limited ability to deal with AGIs more intelligent than us, AI-
boxing techniques seem to have value as a first line of defense
and it may be worthwhile to invest in developing off-the-shelf
software packages for AI confinement that are easy and cheap
to use. A research project that developed AGI unexpectedly
might not have been motivated to make major investments in
security, but the AGI might still be sufficiently limited in
intelligence that confinement would work. Having a defense
that is easy to deploy will make it more likely that these kinds
of projects will implement better precautions.
However, at the same time there is a risk that this will
promote a false sense of security and make research teams
think that they have carried out their duty to be cautious
merely because they are running elementary confinement
protocols. Although some confinement procedures can be
implemented on top of an AGI that was not expressly
designed for confinement, they are much less reliable than
with an AGI that was built with confinement considerations in
mind [30]—and even then, relying solely on confinement is a
risky strategy. We are therefore somewhat cautious in our
recommendation to develop confinement techniques.
4.2. AGI enforcement
One problem with AI confinement proposals is that humans
are tasked with guarding machines that may be far more
intelligent than themselves [118]. One proposed solution for
this problem is to give the task of watching AGIs to
other AGIs.
Armstrong [27] proposes that the trustworthiness of a
superintelligent system could be monitored via a chain of less
powerful systems, all the way down to humans. Although
humans could not verify and understand the workings of a
superintelligence, they could verify and understand an AGI
just slightly above their own level, which could in turn verify
and understand an AGI somewhat above its own level, and
so on.
Chaining multiple levels of AI systems with progres-
sively greater capacity seems to be replacing the problem of
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building a safe AI with a multi-system, and possibly more
difficult, version of the same problem. Armstrong himself
admits that there are several problems with the proposal.
There could be numerous issues along the line, such as a
break in the chain of communication or an inability of a
system to accurately assess the mind of another (smarter)
system. There is also the problem of creating a trusted bottom
for the chain in the first place, which is not necessarily any
easier than creating a trustworthy superintelligence.
Hall [128] writes that there will be a great variety of
AGIs, with those that were designed to be moral or aligned
with human interests keeping the non-safe ones in check.
Goertzel [115] also propose that we build a community of
mutually policing AGI systems of roughly equal levels of
intelligence. If an AGI started to ‘go off the rails’, the other
AGIs could stop it. This might not prevent a single AGI from
undergoing an intelligence explosion, but a community of
AGIs might be in a better position to detect and stop it than
humans would.
Having AGIs police each other is only useful if the group
of AGIs actually has goals and values that are compatible
with human goals and values. To this end, appropriate
internal constraints are needed.
The proposal of a society of mutually policing AGIs
would avoid the problem of trying to control a more intelli-
gent mind. If a global network of mildly superintelligent
AGIs could be instituted in such a manner, it might detect and
prevent any nascent takeoff. However, by itself such an
approach is not enough to ensure safety—it helps guard
against individual AGIs ‘going off the rails’, but it does not
help in a scenario where the programming of most AGIs is
flawed and leads to non-safe behavior. It thus needs to be
combined with the appropriate internal constraints.
A complication is that a hard takeoff is a relative term—
an event that happens too fast for any outside observer to
stop. Even if the AGI network were a hundred times more
intelligent than a network composed of only humans, there
might still be a more sophisticated AGI that could overcome
the network.
4.2.1. ‘AGI enforcement’ proposals: our view. AGI
enforcement proposals are in many respects similar to social
integration proposals (section 3.2), in that they depend on the
AGIs being part of a society which is strong enough to stop
any single AGI from misbehaving. The greatest challenge is
then to make sure that most of the AGIs in the overall system
are safe and do not unite against humans rather than against
misbehaving AGIs. Also, there might not be a natural
distinction between a distributed AGI and a collection of
many different AGIs and AGI design is in any case likely to
make heavy use of earlier AI/AGI techniques. AGI
enforcement proposals therefore seem like implementation
variants of various internal constraint proposals (section 5),
rather than independent proposals.
5. Internal constraints
In addition to external constraints, AGIs could be designed
with internal motivations designed to ensure that they would
take actions in a manner beneficial to humanity. Alternatively,
AGIs could be built with internal constraints that make them
easier to control via external means.
With regard to internal constraints, Yudkowsky distin-
guishes between technical failure and philosophical fail-
ure [309]:
Technical failure is when you try to build an
AI and it does not work the way you think it
does—you have failed to understand the true
workings of your own code. Philosophical
failure is trying to build the wrong thing, so
that even if you succeeded you would still fail
to help anyone or benefit humanity. Needless
to say, the two failures are not mutually
exclusive.
In practice, it is not always easy to distinguish between
the two. Most of the discussion below focuses on the philo-
sophical problems of various proposals, but some of the
issues, such as whether or not a proposal is actually possible
to implement, are technical.
5.1. Oracle AI
An Oracle AI is a hypothetical AGI that executes no actions
other than answering questions. This might not be as safe as it
sounds, however. Correctly defining ‘take no actions’ might
prove surprisingly tricky [30] and the oracle could give
flawed advice even if it did correctly restrict its actions.
Some possible examples of flawed advice: as extra
resources are useful for the fulfilment of nearly all goals
[211, 212], the oracle may seek to obtain more resources—
such as computing power—in order to answer questions more
accurately. Its answers might then be biased toward furthering
this goal, even if this temporarily reduces the accuracy of its
answers, if it believes this to increase the accuracy of its
answers in the long run. Another example is that if the oracle
had the goal of answering as many questions as possible as
fast as possible, it could attempt to manipulate humans into
asking it questions that were maximally simple and easy to
answer.
Holden Karnofsky has suggested that an Oracle AI could
be safe if it was ‘just a calculator’, a system which only
computed things that were asked of it, taking no goal-directed
actions of its own. Such a ‘tool-Oracle AI’ would keep
humans as the ultimate decision makers. Furthermore, the first
team to create a tool-Oracle AI could use it to become
powerful enough to prevent the creation of other AGIs
[162, 163].
An example of a tool-Oracle AI approach might be
Omohundroʼs [213] proposal of ‘safe-AI scaffolding’: creat-
ing highly constrained AGI systems which act within limited,
predetermined parameters. These could be used to develop
17
Phys. Scr. 90 (2015) 018001 Invited Comment
formal verification methods and solve problems related to the
design of more intelligent, but still safe, AGI systems.
5.1.1. Oracles are likely to be released. As with a boxed
AGI, there are many factors that would tempt the owners of
an Oracle AI to transform it to an autonomously acting agent.
Such an AGI would be far more effective in furthering its
goals, but also far more dangerous.
Current narrow-AI technology includes HFT algorithms,
which make trading decisions within fractions of a second, far
too fast to keep humans in the loop. HFT seeks to make a very
short-term profit, but even traders looking for a longer-term
investment benefit from being faster than their competitors.
Market prices are also very effective at incorporating various
sources of knowledge [135]. As a consequence, a trading
algorithmʼs performance might be improved both by making
it faster and by making it more capable of integrating various
sources of knowledge. Most advances toward general AGI
will likely be quickly taken advantage of in the financial
markets, with little opportunity for a human to vet all the
decisions. Oracle AIs are unlikely to remain as pure oracles
for long.
Similarly, Wallach [283] discuss the topic of autonomous
robotic weaponry and note that the US military is seeking to
eventually transition to a state where the human operators of
robot weapons are ‘on the loop’ rather than ‘in the loop’. In
other words, whereas a human was previously required to
explicitly give the order before a robot was allowed to initiate
possibly lethal activity, in the future humans are meant to
merely supervise the robotʼs actions and interfere if some-
thing goes wrong.
Human Rights Watch [90] reports on a number of
military systems which are becoming increasingly autono-
mous, with the human oversight for automatic weapons
defense systems—designed to detect and shoot down
incoming missiles and rockets—already being limited to
accepting or overriding the computerʼs plan of action in a
matter of seconds. Although these systems are better
described as automatic, carrying out pre-programmed
sequences of actions in a structured environment, than
autonomous, they are a good demonstration of a situation
where rapid decisions are needed and the extent of human
oversight is limited. A number of militaries are considering
the future use of more autonomous weapons.
In general, any broad domain involving high stakes,
adversarial decision making and a need to act rapidly is likely
to become increasingly dominated by autonomous systems.
The extent to which the systems will need general intelligence
will depend on the domain, but domains such as corporate
management, fraud detection and warfare could plausibly
make use of all the intelligence they can get. If oneʼs
opponents in the domain are also using increasingly
autonomous AI/AGI, there will be an arms race where one
might have little choice but to give increasing amounts of
control to AI/AGI systems.
Miller [189] also points out that if a person was close to
death, due to natural causes, being on the losing side of a war,
or any other reason, they might turn even a potentially
dangerous AGI system free. This would be a rational course
of action as long as they primarily valued their own survival
and thought that even a small chance of the AGI saving their
life was better than a near-certain death.
Some AGI designers might also choose to create less
constrained and more free-acting AGIs for aesthetic or moral
reasons, preferring advanced minds to have more freedom.
5.1.2. Oracles will become authorities. Even if humans were
technically kept in the loop, they might not have the time,
opportunity, motivation, intelligence, or confidence to verify
the advice given by an Oracle AI. This may be a danger even
with narrower AI systems. Friedman [102] discuss APACHE, an
expert system that provides medical advice to doctors. They
write that as the medical community puts more and more trust
into APACHE, it may become common practice to act
automatically on APACHEʼs recommendations and it may
become increasingly difficult to challenge the ‘authority’ of
the recommendations. Eventually, APACHE may in effect begin
to dictate clinical decisions.
Likewise, Bostrom [53] point out that modern bureau-
crats often follow established procedures to the letter, rather
than exercising their own judgment and allowing themselves
to be blamed for any mistakes that follow. Dutifully following
all the recommendations of an AGI system would be an even
better way of avoiding blame.
Wallach [283] note the existence of robots which attempt
to automatically detect the locations of hostile snipers and to
point them out to soldiers. To the extent that these soldiers
have come to trust the robots, they could be seen as carrying
out the robots’ orders. Eventually, equipping the robot with
its own weapons would merely dispense with the formality of
needing to have a human to pull the trigger.
Thus, even AGI systems that function purely to provide
advice will need to be explicitly designed to be safe in the
sense of not providing advice that would go against human
values [282]. Yudkowsky [313] further notes that an Oracle
AI might choose a plan that is beyond human comprehension,
in which case there is still a need to design it as explicitly safe
and conforming to human values.
5.1.3. ‘Oracle AI’ proposals: our view. Much like with
external constraints, it seems like Oracle AIs could be a
useful stepping stone on the path toward safe, freely acting
AGIs. However, because any Oracle AI can be relatively
easily turned into a free-acting AGI and because many people
will have an incentive to do so, Oracle AIs are not by
themselves a solution to AGI risk, even if they are safer than
free-acting AGIs when kept as pure oracles.
5.2. Top-down safe AGI
AGIs built to take autonomous actions will need to be
designed with safe motivations. Wallach and Allen divide
approaches for ensuring safe behavior into ‘top-down’ and
‘bottom-up’ approaches [14, 15, 281, 282, 284]. They define
top-down approaches as ones that take a specified ethical
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theory and attempt to build a system capable of implementing
that theory [282].
Wallach and Allen [14, 15, 281, 282, 284] have
expressed skepticism about the feasibility of both pure top-
down and bottom-up approaches, arguing for a hybrid
approach30. With regard to top-down approaches, which
attempt to derive an internal architecture from a given ethical
theory, Wallach [281] finds three problems:
1. ‘Limitations already recognized by moral philosophers:
For example, in a utilitarian calculation, how can
consequences be calculated when information is limited
and the effects of actions cascade in never-ending
interactions? Which consequences should be factored
into the maximization of utility? Is there a stopping
procedure?’ [281].
2. The ‘frame problem’ refers to the challenge of
discerning relevant from irrelevant information without
having to consider all of it, as all information could be
relevant in principle [8, 85]. Moral decision-making
involves a number of problems that are related to the
frame problem, such as needing to know what effects
different actions have on the world and needing to
estimate whether one has sufficient information to
accurately predict the consequences of the actions.
3. ‘The need for background information. What mechan-
isms will the system require in order to acquire the
information it needs to make its calculations? How does
one ensure that this information is up to date in real
time?’ [281].
To some extent, these problems may be special cases of the
fact that we do not yet have AGI with good general learning
capabilities: creating an AGI would also require solving the
frame problem, for instance. These problems might therefore
not all be as challenging as they seem at first, presuming that
we manage to develop AGI in the first place.
5.2.1. Three laws. Probably the most widely known
proposal for machine ethics is Isaac Asimovʼs [33] three
laws of robotics:
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey orders given to it by human beings
except where such orders would conflict with the
first law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such
protection does not conflict with either the first or
second law.
Asimov and other writers later expanded the list to include a
number of additional laws, including the zeroth law:
A robot may not harm humanity, or through
inaction allow humanity to come to harm.
Although the three laws are widely known and have
inspired numerous imitations, several of Asimovʼs own
stories were written to illustrate the fact that the laws
contained numerous problems. They have also drawn heavy
critique from others [23, 75, 76, 120, 180, 201,
224, 282, 295, 296] and are not considered a viable approach
for safe AI. Among their chief shortcomings is the fact that
they are too ambiguous to implement and, if defined
with complete accuracy, contradict each other in many
situations.
5.2.2. Categorical imperative. The best-known universal
ethical axiom is Kantʼs categorical imperative. Many
authors have discussed using the categorical imperative as
the foundation of AGI morality [14, 40, 41, 63, 222, 256,
282]. All of these authors conclude that Kantian ethics is a
problematic goal for AGI, though Powers [222] still remains
hopeful about its prospects.
5.2.3. Principle of voluntary joyous growth. Goertzel
[106, 107] considers a number of possible axioms before
settling on what he calls the ‘principle of voluntary joyous
growth’, defined as ‘maximize happiness, growth and choice’.
He starts by considering the axiom ‘maximize happiness’, but
then finds this to be problematic and adds ‘growth’, which he
defines as ‘increase in the amount and complexity of patterns
in the universe’. Finally he adds ‘choice’ in order to allow
sentient beings to ‘choose their own destiny’.
5.2.4. Utilitarianism. Classic utilitarianism is an ethical
theory stating that people should take actions that lead to
the greatest amount of happiness and the smallest amount of
suffering. The prospects for AGIs implementing a utilitarian
moral theory have been discussed by several authors
[14, 19, 21, 77, 104, 119, 121, 199, 282]. The consensus is
that pure classical utilitarianism is problematic and does not
capture all human values. For example, a purely utilitarian
AGI could reprogram the brains of humans so that they did
nothing but experience the maximal amount of pleasure all
the time and that prospect seems unsatisfactory to many31.
5.2.5. Value learning. Freeman [101] describes a decision-
making algorithm which observes peopleʼs behavior, infers
their preferences in the form of a utility function and then
attempts to carry out actions which fulfil everyoneʼs
preferences. Similarly, Dewey [88] discusses value learners,
AGIs which are provided a probability distribution over
possible utility functions that humans may have. Value
learners then attempt to find the utility functions with the best
match for human preferences. Hibbard [153] builds on
Deweyʼs work to offer a similar proposal.
30 For a definition of bottom-up approaches, see section 5.3.
31 Note that utilitarianism is not the same thing as having a utility function.
Utilitarianism is a specific kind of ethical system, while utility functions are
general-purpose mechanisms for choosing between actions and can in
principle be used to implement very different kinds of ethical systems, such
as egoism and possibly even rights-based theories and virtue ethics [217].
19
Phys. Scr. 90 (2015) 018001 Invited Comment
One problem with conceptualizing human desires as
utility functions is that human desires change over time
[272] and also violate the axioms of utility theory required
to construct a coherent utility function [271]. While it is
possible to treat inconsistent choices as random deviations
from an underlying ‘true’ utility function that is then
learned [207], this does not seem to properly describe
human preferences. Rather, human decision making and
preferences seem to be driven by multiple competing
systems, only some of which resemble utility functions
[81]. Even if a true utility function could be constructed, it
does not take into account the fact that we have second-
order preferences, or desires about our desires: a drug addict
may desire a drug, but also desire that he not desire it [98].
Similarly, we often wish that we had stronger desires
toward behaviors which we consider good but cannot make
ourselves engage in. Taking second-order preferences into
account leads to what philosophers call ‘ideal preference’
theories of value [55, 176, 225, 247,
249, 264, 314].
Taking this into account, it has been argued that we
should aim to build AGIs which act according to humanityʼs
extrapolated values [199, 265, 308]. Yudkowsky proposes
attempting to discover the ‘coherent extrapolated volition’
(CEV) of humanity, which he defines as [308]
our wish if we knew more, thought faster,
were more the people we wished we were, had
grown up farther together; where the extra-
polation converges rather than diverges, where
our wishes cohere rather than interfere; extra-
polated as we wish that extrapolated, inter-
preted as we wish that interpreted.
CEV remains vaguely defined and has been criticized by
several authors [109, 115, 148, 189, 294]. However, Tarleton
[265] finds CEV a promising approach and suggests that CEV
has five desirable properties, and that many different kinds of
algorithms could possess these features:
Meta-algorithm: Most of the AGIʼs goals will be obtained
at runtime from human minds, rather than explicitly
programmed in before runtime.
Factually correct beliefs: The AGI will attempt to obtain
correct answers to various factual questions, in order to
modify preferences or desires that are based upon false
factual beliefs.
Singleton: Only one superintelligent AGI is to be
constructed and it is to take control of the world with
whatever goal function is decided upon.
Reflection: Individual or group preferences are reflected
upon and revised.
Preference aggregation: The set of preferences of a whole
group are to be combined somehow.
At least two CEV variants have been proposed: coherent
aggregated volition [109] and coherent blended volition
[115]. Goertzel [115] describe a methodology which was used
to help end the apartheid in South Africa. The methodology
involves people with different views exploring different
future scenarios together and in great detail. By exploring
different outcomes together, the participants build emotional
bonds and mutual understanding, seeking an outcome that
everyone can agree to live with. The authors characterize the
coherent blended volition of a diverse group as analogous to
the ‘conceptual blend’ resulting from the methodology,
incorporating the most essential elements of the group into
a harmonious whole.
Christiano [73] attempts to sketch out a formalization of a
value extrapolation approach called ‘indirect normativity’. It
proposes a technique that would allow an AI to approximate
the kinds of values a group of humans would settle on if they
could spend an unbounded amount of time and resources
considering the problem.
Other authors have begun preliminary work on simpler
value learning systems, designed to automatically learn moral
principles. Anderson et al [18, 20, 21] have built systems
based around various moral duties and principles. As lists of
duties do not in and of themselves specify what to do when
they conflict, the systems let human experts judge how each
conflict should be resolved and then attempt to learn general
rules from the judgments. As put forth, however, this
approach would have little ability to infer ethical rules which
did not fit the framework of proposed duties. Improved
computational models of ethical reasoning
[18, 20, 21, 32, 185, 186], perhaps incorporating work from
neuroscience and moral psychology [42, 199, 245], could
help address this. Potapov [221] propose an approach by
which an AGI could gradually learn the values of other agents
as its understanding of the world improved.
A value extrapolation process seems difficult to specify
exactly, as it requires building an AGI with programming that
formally and rigorously defines human values. Even if it
manages to avoid the first issue in Wallachʼs [281] list
(section 5.2), top-down value extrapolation may fall victim to
other issues, such as computational tractability. One inter-
pretation of CEV would seem to require modeling not only
the values of everyone on Earth, but also the evolution of
those values as the people in question interacted with each
other, became more intelligent and more like their ideal
selves, chose which of their values they wanted to preserve,
etc. Even if the AGI could eventually obtain the enormous
amount of computing power required to run this model, its
behavior would need to be safe from the beginning, or it
could end up doing vast damage to humanity before
understanding what it was doing wrong.
Goertzel and Pittʼs [115] hybrid approach, in which AGIs
cooperate with humans in order to discover the values
humans wish to see implemented, seems more likely to avoid
the issue of computational tractability. However, it will fail to
work in a hard takeoff situation where AGIs take control
before being taught the correct human values. Another issue
with coherent blended volition is that schemes which require
absolute consensus are unworkable with large groups, as
anyone whose situation would be worsened by a change of
events could block the consensus. A general issue with value
extrapolation approaches is that there may be several valid
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ways of defining a value extrapolation process, with no
objective grounds for choosing one rather than another.
Goertzel [109] notes that in formal reasoning systems a
set of initially inconsistent beliefs which the system attempts
to resolve might arrive at something very different than the
initial belief set, even if there existed a consistent belief set
that was closer to the original set. He suggests that something
similar might happen when attempting to make human values
consistent, though whether this would be a bad thing is
unclear.
5.2.6. ‘Top-down safe AGI’ proposals: our view. Of the
various top-down proposals, value learning proposals seem to
be the only ones which properly take into account the
complexity of value thesis (section 2.2), as they attempt to
specifically take into account considerations such as ‘would
humanity have endorsed this course of action if it had known
the consequences?’ Although there are many open questions
concerning the computational tractability as well as the
general feasibility of such approaches, they seem like some of
the most important ones to work on.
5.3. Bottom-up and hybrid safe AGI
Wallach [281] defines bottom-up approaches as ones that
favor evolving or simulating the mechanisms that give rise to
our moral decisions. Another alternative is hybrid approaches,
combining parts of both top-down and bottom-up approaches.
A problem with pure bottom-up approaches is that
techniques such as artificial evolution or merely rewarding the
AGI for the right behavior may cause it to behave correctly in
tests, but would not guarantee that it would behave safely in
any other situation. Even if an AGI seems to have adopted
human values, the actual processes driving its behavior may
be very different from the processes that would be driving the
actions of a human who behaved similarly. It might then
behave very unexpectedly in situations which are different
enough [152, 229, 309, 312].
Armstrong, Sandberg and Bostrom discuss various pro-
blems related to such approaches and offer examples of
concepts which seem straightforward to humans but are not as
simple as they may seem on the surface. One of their
examples relates to the concept of time [30]:
If the [AGI] had the reasonable-sounding
moral premise that ‘painlessly killing a human
being, who is going to die in a micro-second
anyway, in order to gain some other good, is
not a crime’, we would not want it to be able to
redefine millennia as seconds.
All humans have an intuitive understanding of time and
no experience with beings who could arbitrarily redefine their
own clocks and might not share the same concept of time.
Such differences in the conceptual grounding of an AGIʼs
values and of human values might not become apparent until
too late.
5.3.1. Evolutionary invariants. Human morality is to a large
extent shaped by evolution [83, 161] and evolutionary
approaches attempt to replicate this process with AGIs.
Hall [128, 131] argues that self-improving AGIs are
likely to exist in competition with many other kinds of self-
improving AGIs. Properties that give AGIs a significant
disadvantage might then be strongly selected against and
disappear. We could attempt to identify evolutionary
invariants, or evolutionarily stable strategies, which would
both survive in a competitive environment and cause an AGI
to treat humans well.
Hall [131] lists self-interest, long planning horizons,
knowledge, an understanding of evolutionary ethics and
guaranteed honesty as invariants that are likely to make an
AGI more moral as well as to persist even under intense
competition. He suggests that, although self-interest may
sound like a bad thing in an AGI, non-self-interested creatures
are difficult to punish. Thus, enlightened self-interest might
be a good thing for an AGI to possess, as it will provide an
outside community with both a stick and a carrot to control
it with.
Similarly, Waser [292] suggests that minds which are
intelligent enough will, due to game-theoretical and other
considerations, become altruistic and cooperative. Waser
[294] proposed the principle of rational universal benevolence
(RUB), the idea that the moral course of action is cooperation
while letting everyone freely pursue their own goals. Waser
proposes that, instead of making human-friendly behavior an
AGIʼs only goal, the AGI would be allowed to have and form
its own goals. However, its goals and actions would be
subject to the constraint that they should respect the principle
of RUB and not force others into a life those others would
disagree with.
Kornai [167] cites Gewirthʼs [103] work on the principle
of generic consistency, which holds that respecting others’
rights to freedom and well-being is a logically necessary
conclusion for any rational agents. Kornai suggests that if the
principle is correct, then AGIs would respect humanityʼs
rights to freedom and well-being, and that AGIs which failed
to respect the principle would be outcompeted by ones
which did.
Something similar was also proposed by Gips [104] and
Versenyi [277], who advocates the creation of ‘wise robots’
that would recognize the extent to which their own well-being
depended on cooperation with humans and would act
accordingly.
Although these approaches expect AGI either to evolve
altruism or to find it the most rational approach, true altruism
or even pure tit-for-tat [34] is not actually the best strategy in
evolutionary terms. Rather, a better strategy is Machiavellian
tit-for-tat: cultivating an appearance of altruism and coopera-
tion when it benefits oneself and acting selfishly when one
can get away with it. Humans seem strongly disposed toward
such behavior [127].
Another problem is that tit-for-tat as a good strategy
assumes that both players are equally powerful and both have
the same options at their disposal. If the AGI became far more
powerful than most humans, it might no longer be in its
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interests to treat humans favorably [97]. This hypothesis can
be tested by looking at human behavior: if exploiting the
weak is an evolutionarily useful strategy, then humans should
engage in it when given the opportunity. Humans who feel
powerful do indeed devalue the worth of the less powerful
and view them as objects of manipulation [164]. They also
tend to ignore social norms [274] and to experience less
distress and compassion toward the suffering of others [273].
Thus, even if an AGI cooperated with other similarly
powerful AGIs, the group of AGIs might still decide to
collectively exploit humans. Similarly, even though there
might be pressure for AGIs to make themselves more
transparent and easily inspected by others, this only persists
for as long as the AGI needs others more than the others need
the AGI.
5.3.2. Evolved morality. Another proposal is to create AGIs
via algorithmic evolution, selecting in each generation the
AGIs which are not only the most intelligent, but also the
most moral. These ideas are discussed to some extent by
Wallach [282].
5.3.3. Reinforcement learning. In machine learning,
reinforcement learning is a model in which an agent takes
various actions and is differentially rewarded for the actions,
after which it learns to perform the actions with the greatest
expected reward. In psychology, it refers to agents being
rewarded for certain actions and thus learning behaviors
which they have a hard time breaking, even if some other
kind of behavior is more beneficial for them later on.
Applied to AGI, the machine learning sense of
reinforcement involves teaching an AGI to behave in a safe
manner by rewarding it for ethical choices and letting it learn
for itself the underlying rules of what constitutes ethical
behavior. In an early example of this kind of proposal,
McCulloch [181] described an ‘ethical machine’ that could
infer the rules of chess by playing the game and suggested
that it could also learn ethical behavior this way.
Hibbard [146, 148] suggested using reinforcement
learning to give AGIs positive emotions toward humans.
Early AGIs would be taught to recognize happiness and
unhappiness in humans, and the results of this learning would
be hard-wired as emotional values in more advanced AGIs.
This training process would then be continued—for example,
by letting the AGIs predict how human happiness would be
affected by various actions and using those predictions as
emotional values.
A reinforcement learner is supplied with a reward signal
and it always has the explicit goal of maximizing the sum of
this reward, any way it can. In order for this goal to align with
human values, humans must engineer the environment so that
the reinforcement learner is prevented from receiving rewards
if human goals are not fulfilled [88]. A reinforcement-learning
AGI only remains safe for as long as humans are capable of
enforcing this limitation and will become unpredictable if it
becomes capable of overcoming it. Hibbard [152] has
retracted his earlier reinforcement learning-based proposals,
as they would allow the AGI to maximize its reinforcement
by modifying humans to be maximally happy, even against
their will [88].
5.3.4. Human-like AGI. Another kind of proposal involves
building AGIs that can learn human values by virtue of being
similar to humans.
Connectionist systems, based on artificial neural nets, are
capable of learning patterns from data without being told what
the patterns are. As some connectionist models have learned
to classify problems in a manner similar to humans
[187, 219, 267], it has been proposed that connectionist
AGI might learn moral principles that are too complex for
humans to specify as explicit rules32. This idea has been
explored by Guarini [123] and Wallach [282].
One specific proposal that draws upon connectionism is
to make AGIs act according to virtue ethics
[14, 281, 282, 284]. These authors note that previous writers
discussing virtuous behavior have emphasized the importance
of learning moral virtues through habit and practice. As it is
impossible to exhaustively define a virtue, virtue ethics has
traditionally required each individual to learn the right
behaviors through ‘bottom-up processes of discovery or
learning’ [282]. Models that mimicked the human learning
process well enough could then potentially learn the same
behaviors as humans do.
Another kind of human-inspired proposal is the sugges-
tion that something like Stan Franklinʼs LIDA architecture
[99, 227, 248], or some other approach based on Bernard
Baarsʼs [35, 36] ‘global workspace’ theory, might enable
moral reasoning. In the LIDA architecture, incoming
information is monitored by specialized attention codelets,
each of which searches the input for specific features. In
particular, moral codelets might look for morally relevant
factors and ally themselves with other codelets to promote
their concerns to the level of conscious attention. Ultimately,
some coalitions will win enough support to accomplish a
specific kind of decision [282, 285, 286].
Goertzel [115] consider human memory systems (episo-
dic, sensorimotor, declarative, procedural, attentional and
intentional) and ways by which human morality might be
formed via their interaction. They briefly discuss the way that
the OpenCog AGI system [113, 141] implements similar
memory systems and how those systems could enable it to
learn morality. Similarly, Goertzel [114] discuss the stages of
moral development in humans and suggest ways by which
they could be replicated in AGI systems, using the specific
example of Novamente, a proprietary version of OpenCog.
Waser [293] also proposes building an AGI by studying
the results of evolution and creating an implementation as
close to the human model as possible.
Human-inspired AGI architectures would intuitively
seem the most capable of learning human values, though
what would be human-like enough remains an open question.
32 But it should be noted that there are also promising non-connectionist
approaches for modeling human classification behavior: see, e.g., Tenenbaum
et al [266].
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It is possible that even a relatively minor variation from the
norm could cause an AGI to adopt values that most humans
would consider undesirable. Getting the details right might
require an extensive understanding of the human brain.
There are also humans who have drastically different
ethics than the vast majority of humanity and argue for the
desirability of outcomes such as the extinction of mankind
[43, 89]. There remains the possibility that even AGIs which
reasoned about ethics in a completely human-like manner
would reach such conclusions.
Humans also have a long track record of abusing power,
or of undergoing major behavioral changes due to relatively
small injuries—the ‘safe Homo sapiens’ problem also
remains unsolved. On the other hand, it seems plausible that
human-like AGIs could be explicitly engineered to avoid such
problems.
The easier that an AGI is to modify the more powerful it
might become [253] and very close recreations of the human
brain may turn out to be difficult to extensively modify and
upgrade. Human-inspired safe AGIs might then end up
outcompeted by AGIs which were easier to modify and which
might or might not be safe.
Even if human-inspired architectures could be easily
modified, the messiness of human cognitive architecture
means that it might be difficult to ensure that their values
remain beneficial during modification. For instance, in LIDA-
like architectures, beneficial behavior will depend on the
correct coalitions of morality codelets winning each time. If
the system undergoes drastic changes, this can be very
difficult if not impossible to ensure.
Most AGI builders will attempt to create a mind that
displays considerable advantages over ordinary humans.
Some such advantages might be best achieved by employing
a very non-human architecture [194], so there will be reasons
to build AGIs that are not as human-like. These could also
end up outcompeting the human-like AGIs.
5.3.5. ‘Bottom-up and hybrid safe AGI’ proposals: our view.
We are generally very skeptical about pure bottom-up
methods, as they only allow a very crude degree of control
over an AGIʼs goals, giving it a motivational system which
can only be relied on to align with human values in the very
specific environments that the AGI has been tested in.
Evolutionary invariants seem incapable of preserving
complexity of value and they might not even be capable of
preserving human survival. Reinforcement learning, on the
other hand, depends on the AGI being incapable of modifying
the environment against the will of its human controllers.
Therefore, none of these three approaches seems workable.
Human-like AGI might have some promise, depending
on exactly how fragile human values were. If the AGI
reasoning process could be made sufficiently human-like,
there is the possibility that the AGI could remain relatively
safe, though less safe than a well-executed value extrapola-
tion-based AGI.
5.4. AGI Nanny
A more general proposal, which could be achieved by either
top-down, bottom-up, or hybrid methods, is the proposal of
an ‘AGI Nanny’ [111, 115]. This is an AGI that is somewhat
more intelligent than humans and is designed to monitor Earth
for various dangers, including more advanced AGI.
The AGI Nanny would be connected to powerful sur-
veillance systems and would control a massive contingent of
robots. It would help abolish problems such as disease,
involuntary death and poverty, while preventing the devel-
opment of technologies that could threaten humanity. The
AGI Nanny would be designed not to rule humanity on a
permanent basis, but to give us some breathing room and time
to design more advanced AGIs. After some predetermined
amount of time, it would cede control of the world to a more
intelligent AGI.
Goertzel [115] briefly discuss some of the problems
inherent in the AGI Nanny proposal. The AGI would have to
come to power in an ethical way and might behave unpre-
dictably despite our best efforts. It might also be easier to
create a dramatically self-improving AGI than to create a
more constrained AGI Nanny.
5.4.1. ‘AGI Nanny’ proposals: our view. Upon asserting
control, the AGI Nanny would need to have precisely
specified goals, so that it would stop other AGIs from
taking control but would also not harm human interests. It is
not clear to what extent defining these goals would be easier
than defining the goals of a more free-acting AGI [200].
Overall, the AGI Nanny seems to have promise, but it is
unclear whether it can be made to work.
5.5. Formal verification
Formal verification methods prove specific properties about
various algorithms. If the complexity and fragility of value
theses hold, it follows that safe AGI requires the ability to
verify that proposed changes to the AGI will not alter its goals
or values. If even a mild drift from an AGIʼs original goals
might lead to catastrophic consequences, then utmost care
should be given to ensuring that the goals will not change
inadvertently. This is particularly the case if there are no
external feedback mechanisms which would correct the drift.
Before modifying itself, an AGI could attempt to formally
prove that the changes would not alter its existing goals and
would therefore keep them intact even during extended self-
modification [309]. Such proofs could be required before self-
modification was allowed to occur and the system could also
be required to prove that this verify-before-modification
property itself would always be preserved during self-
modification.
Formal verification is also an essential part of Omohun-
droʼs [213] safe-AI scaffolding strategy, as noted in
section 5.6.4.
Spears [255] combines machine learning and formal
verification methods to ensure that AIs remain within the
bounds of pre-specified constraints after having learned new
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behaviors. She attempts to identify ‘safe’ machine learning
operators, which are guaranteed to preserve the systemʼs
constraints.
One AGI system built entirely around the concept of
formal verification is the Gdel machine [236, 258]. It consists
of a solver, which attempts to achieve the goals set for the
machine, and a searcher, which has access to a set of axioms
that completely describe the machine. The searcher may
completely rewrite any part of the machine, provided that it
can produce a formal proof showing that such a rewrite will
further the systemʼs goals.
Goertzel [110] proposes goal-oriented learning meta-
architecture (GOLEM), a meta-architecture that can be wrapped
around a variety of different AGI systems. GOLEM will only
implement changes that are predicted to be more effective at
achieving the original goal of the system. Goertzel argues that
GOLEM is likely to be both self-improving and steadfast: either
it pursues the same goals it had at the start, or it stops acting
altogether.
Unfortunately, formalizing the AGIʼs goals in a manner
that will allow formal verification methods to be used is a
challenging task. Within cryptography, many communica-
tions protocols have been proven secure, only for successful
attacks to be later developed against their various imple-
mentations. While the formal proofs were correct, they con-
tained assumptions which did not accurately capture the way
the protocols worked in practice [84]. Proven theorems are
only as good as their assumptions, so formal verification
requires good models of the AGI hardware and software.
5.5.1. ‘Formal verification’ proposals: our view. Compared to
the relatively simple domain of cryptographic security,
verifying things such as ‘does this kind of a change to the
AGIʼs code preserve its goal of respecting human values?’
seems like a much more open-ended and difficult task, one
which might even prove impossible. Regardless, it is the only
way of achieving high confidence that a system is safe, so it
should at least be attempted.
5.6. Motivational weaknesses
Finally, there is a category of internal constraints that, while
not making an AGIʼs values safer, make it easier to control
AGI via external constraints.
5.6.1. High discount rates. AGI systems could be given a
high discount rate, making them value short-term goals and
gains far more than long-term goals and gains [30, 243]. This
would inhibit the AGIʼs long-term planning, making it more
predictable. However, an AGI can also reach long-term goals
through a series of short-term goals [30]. Another possible
problem is that it could cause the AGI to pursue goals which
were harmful for humanityʼs long-term future. Humanity may
arguably be seen as already behaving in ways that imply an
excessively high discount rate, such as by consuming finite
natural resources without properly taking into account the
well-being of future generations.
5.6.2. Easily satiable goals. Shulman [243] proposes
designing AGIs in such a way that their goals are easy to
satisfy. For example, an AGI could receive a near-maximum
reward for simply continuing to receive an external reward
signal, which could be cut if humans suspected misbehavior.
The AGI would then prefer to cooperate with humans rather
than trying to attack them, even if it was very sure of its
chances of success33. Likewise, if the AGI could receive a
maximal reward with a relatively small fraction of humanityʼs
available resources, it would have little to gain from seizing
more resources.
An extreme form of this kind of a deal is Orseau and
Ringʼs [214] ‘simpleton gambit’, in which an AGI is
promised everything that it would ever want, on the condition
that it turn itself into a harmless simpleton. Orseau and Ring
consider several hypothetical AGI designs, many of which
seem likely to accept the gambit, given certain assumptions.
In a related paper, Ring [229] consider the consequences
of an AGI being able to modify itself to receive the maximum
possible reward. They show that certain types of AGIs will
then come to only care about their own survival. Hypothe-
tically, humans could promise not to threaten such AGIs in
exchange for them agreeing to be subject to AI-boxing
procedures. For this to work, the system would have to
believe that humans will take care of its survival against
external threats better than it could itself. Hibbard [150, 153]
discusses the kinds of AGIs that would avoid the behaviors
described by Ring and Orseau [214, 229].
5.6.3. Calculated indifference. Another proposal is to make
an AGI indifferent to a specific event. For instance, the AGI
could be made indifferent to the detonation of explosives
attached to its hardware, which might enable humans to have
better control over it [28, 30].
5.6.4. Programmed restrictions. Goertzel [115] suggest we
ought to ensure that an AGI does not self-improve too fast,
because AGIs will be harder to control as they become more
and more cognitively superior to humans. To limit the rate of
self-improvement in AGIs, perhaps AGIs could be
programmed to extensively consult humans and other AGI
systems while improving themselves, in order to ensure that
no unwanted modifications would be implemented.
Omohundro [213] discusses a number of programmed
restrictions in the form of constraints on what the AGI is
allowed to do, with formal proofs being used to ensure that an
AGI will not violate its safety constraints. Such limited AGI
systems would be used to design more sophisticated AGIs.
Programmed restrictions are problematic, as the AGI
might treat these merely as problems to solve in the process of
meeting its goals and attempt to overcome them [212].
Making an AGI not want to quickly self-improve might not
solve the problem by itself. If the AGI ends up with a second-
order desire to rid itself of such a disinclination, the stronger
33 On the other hand, this might incentivize the AGI to deceive its
controllers into believing it was behaving properly and also to actively hide
any information which it even suspected might be interpreted as misbehavior.
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desire will eventually prevail [259]. Even if the AGI wanted
to maintain its disinclination toward rapid self-improvement,
it might still try to circumvent the goal in some other way,
such as by creating a copy of itself which did not have that
disinclination [212]. Regardless, such limits could help
control less sophisticated AGIs.
5.6.5. Legal machine language. Weng et al [296, 297]
propose a ‘legal machine language’ which could be used to
formally specify actions which the AGI is allowed or
disallowed to do. Governments could then enact laws
written in legal machine language, allowing them to be
programmed into robots.
5.6.6. ‘Motivational weaknesses’ proposals: our view.
Overall, motivational weaknesses seem comparable to
external constraints: possibly useful and worth studying, but
not something to rely on exclusively, particularly in the case
of superintelligent AGIs. As with external constraints and
Oracle AIs, an arms race situation might provide a
considerable incentive to loosen or remove such constraints.
6. Conclusion
We began this paper by noting that a number of researchers
are predicting AGI in the next twenty to one hundred years.
One must not put excess trust in this time frame: as Arm-
strong [29] show, experts have been terrible at predicting
AGI. Muehlhauser [200] consider a number of methods other
than expert opinion that could be used for predicting AGI, but
find that they too provide suggestive evidence at best.
It would be a mistake, however, to leap from ‘AGI is
very hard to predict’ to ‘AGI must be very far away’. Our
brains are known to think about uncertain, abstract ideas like
AGI in ‘far mode’, which also makes it feel like AGI must be
temporally distant [198, 268], but something being uncertain
is not strong evidence that it is far away. When we are highly
ignorant about something, we should widen our error bars in
both directions. Thus, we should not be highly confident that
AGI will arrive this century and we should not be highly
confident that it will not.
Next, we explained why AGIs may be an existential risk.
A trend toward automatization would give AGIs increased
influence in society and there might be a discontinuity in
which they gained power rapidly. This could be a disaster for
humanity if AGIs do not share our values and, in fact, it looks
difficult to make them share our values because human values
are complex and fragile, and therefore problematic to specify.
The recommendations given for dealing with the problem
can be divided into proposals for societal action (section 3),
external constraints (section 4) and internal constraints
(section 5). Many proposals seem to suffer from serious
problems, or seem to be of limited effectiveness. Others seem
to have enough promise to be worth exploring. We will
conclude by reviewing the proposals which we feel are
worthy of further study.
As a brief summary of our views, in the medium term, we
think that the proposals of AGI confinement (section 4.1),
Oracle AI (section 5.1) and motivational weaknesses
(section 5.6) would have promise in helping create safer
AGIs. These proposals share in common the fact that,
although they could help a cautious team of researchers create
an AGI, they are not solutions to the problem of AGI risk, as
they do not prevent others from creating unsafe AGIs, nor are
they sufficient in guaranteeing the safety of sufficiently
intelligent AGIs. Regulation (section 3.3) as well as human
capability enhancement (section 3.4) could also help to
somewhat reduce AGI risk. In the long run, we will need the
ability to guarantee the safety of freely acting AGIs. For this
goal, value learning (section 5.2.5) would seem like the most
reliable approach if it could be made to work, with human-
like architecture (section 5.3.4) a possible alternative which
seems less reliable but possibly easier to build. Formal ver-
ification (section 5.5) seems like a very important tool in
helping to ensure the safety of our AGIs, regardless of the
exact approach that we choose.
Responses to catastrophic AGI risk
Societal proposals
Do nothing AGI is distant
Little risk, no action needed
Let them kill us
Integrate to society Legal and economic controls
Foster positive values
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Of the societal proposals, we are supportive of the calls to
regulate AGI development, but we admit there are many
practical hurdles which might make this infeasible. The
economic and military potential of AGI, and the difficulty of
verifying regulations and arms treaties restricting it, could
lead to unstoppable arms races.
We find ourselves in general agreement with the authors
who advocate funding additional research into safe AGI as the
primary solution. Such research will also help establish the
kinds of constraints which would make it possible to suc-
cessfully carry out integration proposals.
Uploading approaches, in which human minds are made
to run on computers and then augmented, might buy us some
time to develop safe AGI. However, it is unclear whether they
can be developed before AGI and large-scale uploading could
create strong evolutionary trends which seem dangerous in
and of themselves. As AGIs seem likely to eventually outpace
uploads, uploading by itself is probably not a sufficient
solution. What uploading could do is to reduce the initial
advantages that AGIs enjoy over (partially uploaded)
humanity, so that other responses to AGI risk can be deployed
more effectively.
External constraints are likely to be useful in controlling
AGI systems of limited intelligence and could possibly help
us develop more intelligent AGIs while maintaining their
safety. If inexpensive external constraints were readily
available, this could encourage even research teams skeptical
about safety issues to implement them. Yet it does not seem
safe to rely on these constraints once we are dealing with a
superhuman intelligence and we cannot trust everyone to be
responsible enough to contain their AGI systems, especially
given the economic pressures to ‘release’ AGIs. For such an
approach to be a solution for AGI risk in general, it would
have to be adopted by all successful AGI projects, at least
until safe AGIs were developed. Much the same is true of
attempting to design Oracle AIs. In the short term, such
efforts may be reinforced by research into motivational
weaknesses, internal constraints that make AGIs easier to
control via external means.
In the long term, the internal constraints that show the
most promise are value extrapolation approaches and human-
like architectures. Value extrapolation attempts to learn
human values and interpret them as we would wish them to be
interpreted. These approaches have the advantage of poten-
tially maximizing the preservation of human values and the
disadvantage that such approaches may prove intractable or
impossible to properly formalize. Human-like architectures
seem easier to construct, as we can simply copy mechanisms
that are used within the human brain, but it seems hard to
build such an exact match as to reliably replicate human
values. Slavish reproductions of the human psyche also seem
likely to be outcompeted by less human, more efficient
architectures.
Both approaches would benefit from better formal ver-
ification methods, so that AGIs which were editing and
improving themselves could verify that the modifications did
not threaten to remove the AGIs’ motivation to follow their
original goals. Studies which aim to uncover the roots of
human morals and preferences also seem like candidates for
research that would benefit the development of safe AGI
[42, 199, 245], as do studies into computational models of
ethical reasoning [186].
We reiterate that when we talk about ‘human values’, we
are not making the claim that human values would be static,
nor that current human values would be ideal. Nor do we
wish to imply that the values of other sentient beings would
be unimportant. Rather, we are seeking to guarantee the
implementation of some very basic values, such as the
avoidance of unnecessary suffering, the preservation of
humanity and the prohibition of forced brain reprogramming.
We believe the vast majority of humans would agree with
these values and be sad to see them lost.
Acknowledgments
We extend special thanks to Luke Muehlhauser for extensive
assistance throughout the writing process. We are grateful to
Olle Häggström for organizing the event that led to this paper
being formally published. We would also like to thank Abram
Demski, Alexei Turchin, Alexey Potapov, Anders Sandberg,
Andras Kornai, Anthony Berglas, Aron Vallinder, Ben
Goertzel, Ben Noble, Ben Sterrett, Brian Rabkin, Bill Hib-
bard, Carl Shulman, Dana Scott, Daniel Dewey, David
Pearce, Evelyn Mitchell, Evgenij Thorstensen, Frank White,
gwern branwen, Harri Valpola, Jaan Tallinn, Jacob Stein-
hardt, James Babcock, James Miller, Joshua Fox, Louie
Helm, Mark Gubrud, Mark Waser, Michael Anissimov,
Michael Vassar, Miles Brundage, Moshe Looks, Randal
Koene, Robin Hanson, Risto Saarelma, Steve Omohundro,
Suzanne Lidström, Steven Kaas, Stuart Armstrong, Tim
Freeman, Ted Goertzel, Toni Heinonen, Tony Barrett, Vin-
cent Mller, Vladimir Nesov, Wei Dai and two anonymous
reviewers as well as several users of http://www.LessWrong.
com for their helpful comments.
26
Phys. Scr. 90 (2015) 018001 Invited Comment
References
[1] Anderson M and Anderson S L (ed) 2011 Machine Ethics
(New York: Cambridge University Press)
[2] Bostrom N and Ćirković M M (ed) 2008 Global Catastrophic
Risks (New York: Oxford University Press)
[3] Bostrom N 2014 Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers,
Strategies (Italy: Oxford University Press)
[4] National DefenseAuthorization 2001Public Law106-398, 114
Stat. 1654 (An act by the US Congress, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/PLAW-106publ398/html/PLAW-106publ398.htm)
[5] Eden A, Søraker J, Moor J H and Steinhart E (ed) 2012
Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical
Assessment (The Frontiers Collection) (Berlin: Springer)
[6] IEEE Spectrum 2008 Tech luminaries address singularity The
Singularity: Special Report http://spectrum.ieee.org/
computing/hardware/tech-luminaries-address-singularity
[7] Kringelbach M L and Berridge K C (ed) 2009 Pleasures of
the Brain (Series in Affective Science) (New York: Oxford
University Press)
[8] Pylyshyn Z W (ed) 1987 The Robot’s Dilemma: The Frame
Problem in Artificial Intelligence (Norwood, NJ: Ablex)
[9] Wood D M and Kirstie B (ed) 2006 A Report on the
Surveillance Society: For the Information Commissioner, by
the Surveillance Studies Network (Wilmslow, UK: Office of




[10] Adams S S et al 2012 Mapping the landscape of human-level
artificial general intelligence AI Mag. 33 25–42
[11] Agar N 2011 Ray Kurzweil and uploading J. Evolution
Technol 22 23–36
[12] Agliata D and Tantleff-Dunn S 2004 The impact of media
exposure on males’ body image J. Social Clinical Psych. 23
7–22
[13] Allen C and Wallach W 2012 Moral machines: contradiction
in terms of abdication of human responsibility Robot Ethics:
The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) pp 55–68
[14] Allen C, Varner G and Zinser J 2000 Prolegomena to any
future artificial moral agent J. Exp. Theor. Art. Intell. 12
251–61
[15] Allen C, Smit I and Wendell W 2005 Artificial morality
Ethics Info. Technol 7 149–55
[16] Allen C, Wallach W and Iva Smit I 2006 Why machine
ethics? IEEE Intell. Systems 21 12–7
[17] Amdahl G M 1967 Validity of the single processor approach
to achieving large scale computing capabilities Proc. Spring
Joint Computer Conference (AFIPS ‘67) (New York: ACM
Press) pp 483–5
[18] Anderson M, Anderson S L and Armen C (ed) 2005 Machine
Ethics Technical Report FS-05-06 (Menlo Park, CA: AAAI
Press)
[19] Anderson M, Anderson S L and Armen C 2005 Towards
machine ethics Machine Ethics Technical Report FS-05-06
(Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press) pp 1–7
[20] Anderson M, Anderson S L and Armen C 2005 MedE-thEx
Caring Machines Technical Report FS-05-02, ed T Bickmore
(Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press) pp 9–16
[21] Anderson M, Anderson S L and Armen C 2006 An approach
to computing ethics IEEE Intell. Systems 21 56–63
[22] Anderson M 2010 Problem solved H+ Magazine
hplusmagazine.com/2010/12/15/problem-solved-
unfriendly-ai
[23] Anderson S L 2011 The unacceptability of Asimov’s three
laws of robotics as a basis for machine ethics Machine
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp 285–96
[24] Annas G J, Andrews L B and Isasi R M 2002 Protecting the
endangered human Am. J. Law Med. 28 151–78
[25] Anthony D and Robbins T 2004 Conversion and
brainwashing in new religious movements The Oxford
Handbook of New Religious Movements ed J R Lewis (New
York: Oxford University Press) pp 243–97
[26] Ronald C and Arkin R C 2009 Governing Lethal Behavior in
Autonomous Robots (Boca Raton, FL: CRC)
[27] Armstrong S 2007 Chaining god www.neweuropeancentury.
org/GodAI.pdf
[28] Armstrong S 2010 Utility indifference www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/
reports/2010-1.pdf
[29] Armstrong S and Sotala K 2012 How we’re predicting AI—or
failing to Proc. Int. Conf. Beyond AI 2012, 5–6 November
2012, Pilsen, Czech Republic (Pilsen: University of West
Bohemia) pp 52–75 (www.kky.zcu.cz/en/publications/1/
JanRomportl_2012_BeyondAIArtificial.pdf)
[30] Armstrong S, Sandberg A and Bostrom N 2012 Thinking
inside the box Minds Machines 22 299–324
[31] Asaro P M Robots and responsibility from a legal perspective
Proc. IEEE Conf. on Robotics and Automation, Workshop
on Roboethics p 59 (www.peterasaro.org/writing/
ASAROLegalPerspective.pdf)
[32] Ashley K D and McLaren B M 1995 Reasoning with reasons
in case-based comparisons Proc. First International Conf.
on Case-Based Reasoning Research and Development ed
M M Veloso and A Aamodt (Berlin: Springer) pp 133–44
(www.cs.cmu.edu/~bmclaren/pubs/AshleyMcLaren-
ReasoningWithReasons-ICCBR95.pdf)
[33] Asimov I 1942 Runaround Astounding Science-Fiction
pp 94–103
[34] Axelrod R 1987 The evolution of strategies in the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma Genetic Algorithms and Simulated
Annealing ed L Davis (Los Altmos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann)
pp 32–41
[35] Baars B J 2002 The conscious access hypothesis Trends
Cogn. Sci. 6 47–52
[36] Baars B J 2005 Global workspace theory of consciousness
The Boundaries of Consciousness (Progress in Brain
Research no 150) ed S Laureys (Boston: Elsevier) pp 45–53
[37] Bach J, Goertzel B and Ikl M (ed) 2012 Artificial General
Intelligence (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence no
7716) (New York: Springer)
[38] Bamford S 2012 A framework for approaches to transfer
of a mind’s sub-strate Int. J. Machine Consciousness 4
23–34
[39] Baum S D, Goertzel B and Goertzel T G 2011 How long until
human-level AI? Results from an expert assessment
Technol. Forecasting Social Change 78 185–95
[40] Beavers A F 2009 Between angles or animals: the question of
robot ethics; or is Kantian moral agency desirable? 18th
Ann. Meeting of Association for Practical and Professional
Ethics, Cincinnati, OH
[41] Beavers A F 2012 Moral machines and the threat of ethical
nihilsm Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of
Robotics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) pp 333–44
[42] Bello P and Bringsjord S 2012 On how to build a moral
machine Topoi doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9129-8
[43] Benatar D 2006 Better Never to Have Been (New York:
Oxford University Press)
[44] Berglas A 2012 Artificial intelligence will kill our
grandchildren (singularity) draft 9 http://berglas.org/Articles/
AIKillGrandchildren/AIKillGrandchildren.html
[45] Blackmore S 2012 She won't be me J. Consciousness Studies
19 16–9
[46] Bostrom N 1998 How long before superintelligence? Int. J.
Futures Studies 2
[47] Bostrom N 2002 Existential risks J. Evolution Technol. 9
www.jetpress.org/volume9/risks.html
27
Phys. Scr. 90 (2015) 018001 Invited Comment
[48] Bostrom N 2003 Ethical issues in advanced artificial
intelligence Cognitive, Emotive and Ethical Aspects of
Decision Making in Humans and in Artificial Intelligence
vol 2 ed I Smit and G E Lasker (Windsor, ON: International
Institute for Advanced Studies in Systems Research and
Cybernetics) pp 12–7
[49] Bostrom N 2004 The future of human evolution Two
Hundred Years After Kant, Fifty Years After Turing (Death
and Anti-Death vol 2) ed C Tandy (Ria University Press)
pp 339–71
[50] Bostrom N 2007 Technological revolutions Nanoscale ed
N M de, S Cameron and M E Mitchell (Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley) pp 129–52
[51] Bostrom N 2012 The superintelligent will Minds Machines 22
71–85
[52] Bostrom N and Cirkovic M M 2011 Introduction Global
Catastrophic Risks (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
pp 1–30
[53] Bostrom N and Yudkowsky E 2014 The ethics of artificial
intelligence Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence
ed K Frankish and W Ramsey (New York: Cambridge
University Press)
[54] Brain M 2003 Robotic nation http://marshallbrain.com/
robotic-nation.htm
[55] Brandt R B 1979 A Theory of the Good and the Right (New
York: Oxford University Press)
[56] Branwen G Slowing Moore’s law www.gwern.net/
SlowingMoore’sLaw
[57] Brin D 1998 The Transparent Society (Reading, MA: Perseus)
[58] Bringsjord S and Bringsjord A 2012 Belief in the singularity
is fideistic Singularity Hypotheses ed A H Eden, J H Moor,
J H Soraker and E Steinhart (Berlin: Springer)
[59] Brooks R A 2008 I, Rodney Brooks, am a robot IEEE
Spectrum 45 68–71
[60] Brynjolfsson E and McAfee A 2011 Race Against the
Machine (Lexington, MA: Digital Frontier)
[61] Bryson J and Kime P 1998 Just another artefact www.cs.
bath.ac.uk/~jjb/web/aiethics98.html
[62] Bryson J J 2010 Robots should be slaves Close Engagements
with Artificial Companions ed Y Wilks (Philadelphia: John
Benjamins) pp 107–26
[63] Bugaj S V and Goertzel B 2007 Five ethical imperatives and
their implications for human-AGI interaction Dynamical
Psychology http://goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2007/
Five_Ethical_Imperatives_svbedit.htm
[64] Butler S 1863 Darwin among the machines The Press
(Christchurch, New Zealand) www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/
tei-ButFir-t1-g1-t1-g1-t4-body.html
[65] Cade C M 1966 Other Worlds Than Ours 1st edn (Museum)
[66] Calandrino J A, Clarkson W and Felten E W 2011 Bubble
trouble Proc. 20th USENIX Security Symp (San Francisco:
USENIX) pp 267–80 www.usenix.org/events/sec11/tech/
full_papers/Calandrino.pdf
[67] Cassimatis N, Mueller E T and Winston P H 2006 Achieving
human-level intelligence through integrated systems and
research AI Mag. 27 12–4 www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/
aimagazine/article/view/1876/1774
[68] Casti J L 2012 X-Events (New York: William Morrow)
[69] Cattell R and Parker A Challenges for brain emulation: why is
building a brain so difficult? http://synapticlink.org/
BrainEmulationChallenges.pdf
[70] Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Securities and
Exchange Commission 2010 Findings regarding the market
events of May 6, 2010 www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/
marketevents-report.pdf
[71] Chalmers D J 1996 The Conscious Mind (Philosophy of Mind
Series) (New York: Oxford University Press)
[72] Chalmers D J 2010 The singularity J. Consciousness Studies
17 7–65
[73] Paul F and Christiano P F 2012 Indirect normativity write-up
Ordinary Ideas http://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/2012/
04/21/indirect-normativity-write-up
[74] Clark G 2007 A Farewell to Alms 1st edn (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press)
[75] Clarke R 1993 Asimov’s laws of robotics Computer 26 53–61
[76] Clarke R 1994 Asimov’s laws of robotics Computer 27 57–66
[77] Cloos C 2005 The utilibot project Machine Ethics Technical
Report FS-05-06 ed M Anderson, S L Anderson and C
Armen (Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press) pp 38–45
[78] Dahm W J A 2010 Technology horizons www.au.af.mil/au/
awc/awcgate/af/tech_horizons_vol-1_may2010.pdf
[79] Daley W 2011 Mitigating potential hazards to humans from
the development of intelligent machines Synthese 2 44–50
(www.synesisjournal.com/vol2_g/2011_2_44-
50_Daley.pdf)
[80] Davis E 2013 The singularity and the state of the art in
artificial intelligence www.cs.nyu.edu/~davise/papers/
singularity.pdf
[81] Dayan P 2011 Models of value and choice Neuroscience of
Preference and Choice ed R J Dolan and T Sharot
(Waltham, MA: Academic) pp 33–52
[82] de Garis H 2005 The Artilect War: Cosmists vs Terrans (Palm
Springs, CA: ETC Publica-Tions)
[83] de Waal F, Wright R, Korsgaard C M, Kitcher P and Singer P
2006 Primates and Philosophers 1st edn (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press)
[84] Degabriele J P, Paterson K and Watson G 2011 Provable
security in the real world IEEE Security Privacy Mag. 9
33–41
[85] Dennett D C 1987 Cognitive wheels The Robot’s Dilemma
ed Z W Pylyshyn (Norwood, NJ: Ablex) pp 41–64
[86] Dennett D C 2012 The mystery of David Chalmers
J. Consciousness Studies 19 86–95
[87] Deutsch D 2011 The Beginning of Infinity 1st edn (New York:
Viking)
[88] Dewey D 2011 Learning what to value Artificial General
Intelligence (Lecture Notes in Computer Science no 6830)
ed J Schmidhuber, K R Thrisson and M Looks (New York:
Springer) pp 309–14
[89] Dietrich E 2014 After the humans are gone Philosophy Now
http://philosophynow.org/issues/61/
After_The_Humans_Are_Gone
[90] Docherty B and Goose S 2012 Losing humanity www.hrw.
org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf
[91] Douglas T 2008 Moral enhancement J. Appl. Phil. 25 228–45
[92] Drexler K E 1986 Engines of Creation (Garden City, NY:
Anchor)
[93] Eckersley P and Sandberg A 2013 Is brain emulation
dangerous? J. Artif. Gen. Intell. 4 170–94
[94] Eisen M 2011 Amazon’s $23,698,655.93 book about flies It is
NOT Junk www.michaeleisen.org/blog/?p=358
[95] Felten E W and Schneider M A 2000 Timing attacks on Web
privacy Proc. 7th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security—CCS ‘00 (New York: ACM
Press) pp 25–32
[96] Ferguson M J, Hassin R and Bargh J A 2007 Implicit
motivation Handbook of Motivation Science
ed J Y Shah and W L Gardner (New York: Guilford)
pp 150–66
[97] Fox J and Shulman C 2010 Superintelligence does not imply
benevolence ECAP10, VIII European Conference of
Computing and Philosophy ed K Mainzer (Munich: Dr Hut)
[98] Frankfurt H G 1971 Freedom of the will and the concept of a
person J. Phil. 68 5–20
[99] Franklin S and Patterson F G Jr 2006 The LIDA architecture




Phys. Scr. 90 (2015) 018001 Invited Comment
[100] Freeman T 2008 Comparative advantage doesn’t ensure
survival www.fungible.com/comparative-advantage.html
[101] Freeman T 2009 Using compassion and respect to motivate an
artificial intelligence www.fungible.com/respect/paper.html
[102] Friedman B and Kahn P H 1992 Human agency and
responsible computing J. Syst. Software 17 7–14
[103] Gewirth A 1978 Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press)
[104] Gips J 1995 Towards the ethical robot Android Epistemology
ed K M Ford, C N Glymour and P J Hayes (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press) pp 243–52
[105] Goertzel B 2006 Apparent limitations on the ‘AI friendliness’
and related concepts imposed by the complexity of the world
www.goertzel.org/papers/LimitationsOnFriendliness.pdf
[106] Goertzel B 2010 Coherent aggregated volition The Multiverse
According to Ben http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.
ca/2010/03/coherent-aggregated-volition-toward.html
[107] Goertzel B 2010 GOLEM http://goertzel.org/GOLEM.pdf
[108] Goertzel B 2012 CogPrime http://wiki.opencog.org/w/
CogPrime_Overview
[109] Goertzel B 2002 Thoughts on AI morality Dynamical
Psychology www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2002/
AIMorality.htm
[110] Goertzel B 2004 Encouraging a positive transcension
Dynamical Psychology www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2004/
PositiveTranscension.htm
[111] Goertzel B 2004 Growth, choice and joy Dynamical
Psychology www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2004/
GrowthChoiceJoy.htm
[112] Goertzel B 2012 Should humanity build a global AI nanny to
delay the singularity until it’s better understood?
J. Consciousness Studies 19 96–111
[113] Goertzel B 2012 When should two minds be considered
versions of one another? Int. J. Machine Consciousness 4
177–85
[114] Goertzel B and Bugaj S V 2008 Stages of ethical
development in artificial general intelligence systems
Artificial General Intelligence (Frontiers in Artificial
Intelligence and Applications no 171) (IOS) 448–59
[115] Goertzel B and Pitt J 2012 Nine ways to bias open-source
AGI toward friendliness J. Evolution Technol. 22 116–31
[116] Golle P and Partridge K 2009 On the anonymity of home/
work location pairs Pervasive Computing (Lecture Notes in
Computer Science no 5538) ed H Tokuda, M Beigl,
A Friday, A Brush and Y Tobe (Berlin: Springer) pp 390–7
[117] Good I J 1965 Speculations concerning the first
ultraintelligent machine Advances in Computers Volume 6
ed F L Alt and M Rubino (New York: Academic) pp 31–88
[118] Good I J 1970 Some future social repercussions of computers
Int. J. Environ. Studies 1 67–79
[119] Good I J 1982 Ethical machines Intelligent Systems (Machine
Intelligence no 10) ed J E Hayes, D Michie and Y-H Pao
(Chichester: Ellis Horwood) pp 555–60
[120] Diana F and Gordon-Spears D F 2003 Asimov’s laws Formal
Approaches to Agent-Based Systems (Lecture Notes in
Computer Science no 2699) ed M G Hinchey, J L Rash,
W F Truszkowski, C Rou and D F Gordon-Spears (Berlin:
Springer) pp 257–9
[121] Christopher Grau G 2006 There is no I in Robot IEEE Intell.
Syst. 21 52–5
[122] Groesz L M, Levine M P and Murnen S K. 2001 The effect of
experimental presentation of thin media images on body
satisfaction Int. J. Eating Disorders 31 1–16
[123] Guarini M 2006 Particularism and the classification and
reclassification of moral cases IEEE Intell. Systems 21 22–8
[124] Gubrud M V 1997 Nanotechnology and international security
www.foresight.org/Conferences/MNT05/Papers/Gubrud/
[125] Gunkel D J 2012 The Machine Question (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press)
[126] Guterl F 2012 The Fate of the Species 1st edn (New York:
Bloomsbury)
[127] Haidt J 2006 The Happiness Hypothesis 1st edn (New York:
Basic)
[128] Hall J S 2007 Beyond AI (Amherst, NY: Prometheus)
[129] Hall J S 2007 Ethics for artificial intellects Nanoethics
ed F Allho, P Lin, J Moor, J Weckert and M C Roco
(New York: Wiley) pp 339–52
[130] Hall J S 2008 Engineering utopia Artificial General
Intelligence Frontiers (Artificial Intelligence and
Applications no 171) ed P Wang, B Goertzel and S Franklin
(Amsterdam: IOS) pp 460–7
[131] Hall J S Ethics for self-improving machines Machine Ethics
ed M Anderson and S L Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press) pp 512–23
[132] Hallevy G 2010 The criminal liability of artificial intelligence
entities http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1564096
[133] Hanson R 2007 Shall we vote on values, but bet on beliefs?
http://hanson.gmu.edu/futarchy.pdf
[134] Hanson R 2009 Prefer law to values Overcoming Bias www.
overcomingbias.com/2009/10/prefer-law-to-values.html
[135] Hanson R 1994 If uploads come first Extropy 6 http://hanson.
gmu.edu/uploads.html
[136] Hanson R 1998 Economic growth given machine intelligence
http://hanson.gmu.edu/aigrow.pdf
[137] Hanson R 2008 Economics of the singularity IEEE Spectrum
45 45–50
[138] Hanson R 2012 Meet the new conflict, same as the old
conflict J. Consciousness Studies 19 119–25
[139] Hare R D, Clark D, Grann M and Thornton D 2000
Psychopathy and the predictive validity of the PCL-R
Behavioral Sci. Law 18 623–45
[140] Harris G T and Rice M E 2006 Treatment of psychopathy
Handbook of Psychopathy ed C J Patrick (New York:
Guilford) pp 555–72
[141] Hart D and Goertzel B 2008 OpenCog: a software framework
for integrative artificial general intelligence www.agiri.org/
OpenCog_AGI-08.pd
[142] Hauskeller M 2012 My brain, my mind, and I Int. J. Machine
Consciousness 4 187–200
[143] Hayworth K J 2012 Electron imaging technology for whole
brain neural circuit mapping Int. J. Machine Consciousness
4 87–108
[144] Heylighen F 2007 Accelerating socio-technological
evolution Globalization as Evolutionary Process
(Rethinking Globalizations no 10) ed G Modelski,
T Devezas and W R Thompson (New York: Routledge)
pp 284–309
[145] Heylighen F 2012 Brain in a vat cannot break out
J. Consciousness Studies 19 126–42
[146] Hibbard B 2005 The ethics and politics of super-intelligent
machines https://sites.google.com/site/whibbard/g/
SI_ethics_politics.doc
[147] Hibbard B 2005 Critique of the SIAI collective volition
theory www.ssec.wisc.edu/~billh/g/SIAI_CV_critique.html
[148] Hibbard B 2012 The error in my 2001 VisFiles column www.
ssec.wisc.edu/~billh/g/visfiles_error.html
[149] Hibbard B 2001 Super-intelligent machines ACM
SIGGRAPH Computer Graphics 35 13–5 (www.siggraph.
org/publications/newsletter/issues/v35/v35n1.pdf)
[150] Hibbard B 2008 Open source AI Artificial General
Intelligence Frontiers (Artificial Intelligence and
Applications no 171) ed P Wang, B Goertzel and S Franklin
(Amsterdam: IOS) pp 473–7
[151] Hibbard B 2012 Model-based utility functions J. Artificial
Gen. Intell. 3 1–24
[152] Hibbard B 2012 Decision support for safe AI design Artificial
General Intelligence (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
29
Phys. Scr. 90 (2015) 018001 Invited Comment
no 7716) ed J Bach, B Goertzel and M Ikl (New York:
Springer) pp 117–25
[153] Hibbard B 2012 Avoiding unintended AI behaviors Artificial
General Intelligence (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
no 7716) ed J Bach, B Goertzel and M Ikl (New York:
Springer) pp 107–16
[154] Hollerbach J M, Mason M T, Henrik I and Christensen H I
2009 A roadmap for US robotics www.us-robotics.us/
reports/CCCReport.pdf
[155] Hopkins P D 2012 Why uploading will not work, or, the
ghosts haunting transhumanism Int. J. Machine
Consciousness 4 229–43
[156] Horvitz E J and Selman B 2009 Interim report from the AAAI
Presidential Panel on long-term AI futures www.aaai.org/
Organization/Panel/panel-note.pdf
[157] Hughes J 2001 Relinquishment or regulation www.trincoll.
edu/orgs/scialnce/sfr/01-02/files/Relinquishment%20or%
20Regulation%203.James%20Hughes.doc
[158] Hutter M 2012 Can intelligence explode? J. Consciousness
Studies 19 143–66
[159] Jenkins A 2003 Artificial intelligence and the real world
Futures 35 779–86
[160] Joy B 2000 Why the future doesn’t need us Wired www.
wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html
[161] Joyce R 2001 Evolution and morality The Myth of Morality
(Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) (New York: Cambridge
University Press)
[162] Karnofsky H 2012 Thoughts on the singularity institute (SI)
Less Wrong http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/
thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/
[163] Karnofsky H and Tallinn J 2011 Karnofsky and Tallinn
dialog on SIAI efficacy http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/
23070378/1331435883/name/Jaan+Tallinn+2011+05
+-+revised.doc
[164] Kipnis D 1972 Does power corrupt? J. Personality Social
Psych. 24 33–41
[165] Koene R A 2012 Experimental research in whole brain
emulation Int. J. Machine Consciousness 4 35–65
[166] Koene R A 2012 Embracing competitive balance Singularity
Hypotheses ed A H Eden, J H Moor, J H Soraker and
E Steinhart (Berlin: Springer)
[167] Kornai A 2014 Bounding the impact of AGI J. Experimental
Theor. Artificial Intell 26 417–38
[168] Kurzweil R 2001 Response to Stephen Hawking www.
kurzweilai.net/response-to-stephen-hawking
[169] Kurzweil R 2002 Locked in his Chinese room www.
kurzweilai.net/chapter-6-locked-in-his-chinese-room-
response-to-john-searle
[170] Kurzweil R 2005 The Singularity Is Near (New York: Viking)
[171] Lampson B W 1973 A note on the confinement problem
Comm. ACM 16 613–5
[172] Legg S 2009 Funding safe AGI Vetta Project www.vetta.org/
2009/08/funding-safe-agi/
[173] Legg S and Hutter M 2007 A collection of definitions of
intelligence Advances in General Intelligence: Concepts
Architecrures and Algorithms (Frontiers in Artificial
Intelligence and Applications no 157) (Amsterdam: IOS)
pp 17–24
[174] Lehman-Wilzig S N 1981 Frankenstein unbound Futures 13
442–57
[175] Levy D 2009 The ethical treatment of artificially conscious
robots Int. J. Social Robotics 1 209–16
[176] Lewis D 1989 Dispositional theories of value Proc.
Aristotelian Soc. Suppl. Volumes 63 113–37
[177] Loosemore R and Goertzel B 2012 Why an intelligence
explosion is probable Singularity Hypotheses ed A H Eden,
J H Moor, J H Soraker and E Steinhart (Berlin: Springer)
[178] Mainzer K (ed) 2010 ECAP10, VIII European Conference of
Computing and Philosophy (Munich: Dr Hut)
[179] Mann S, Nolan J and Wellman B 2003 Sousveillance
Surveillance Soc. 1 331–55
[180] McCauley L 2007 AI armageddon and the three laws of
robotics Ethics Information Technol. 9 153–64
[181] McCulloch W S 1956 Toward some circuitry of ethical
robots; or, an observational science of the genesis of social
evaluation in the mind-like behavior of artifacts Acta
Biotheoretica 11 147–56
[182] McDermott D 2012 Response to the singularity by David
Chalmers J. Consciousness Studies 19 167–72
[183] McGinnis J O 2010 Accelerating AI Northwestern University
Law Rev. 104 1253–70 www.law.northwestern.edu/
lawreview/v104/n3/1253/LR104n3McGinnis.pdf
[184] McKibben B 2003 Enough (New York: Henry Holt)
[185] McLaren B M 2003 Extensionally defining principles and
cases in ethics Artificial Intell. 150 145–81
[186] McLaren B M 2006 Computational models of ethical
reasoning IEEE Intell. Syst. 21 29–37
[187] McLeod P, Plunkett K and Rolls E T 1998 Introduction to
Connectionist Modelling of Cognitive Processes (New York:
Oxford University Press)
[188] Hans Meuer H, Strohmaier E, Dongarra J and Simon H 2012
Top500 list—November 2012 www.top500.org/list/
2012/11/
[189] Miller J D 2012 Singularity Rising (Dallas, TX: BenBella)
[190] Minsky M, Singh P and Sloman A 2004 The St Thomas
common sense symposium AI Mag. 25 113–24
[191] Moore D, Shannon C and Brown J 2002 Code-red Proc.
Second ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet Measurment
(IMW ‘02) (New York: ACM) pp 273–84
[192] Moore D, Paxson V, Savage S, Shannon C, StanIford S and
Weaver N 2003 Inside the slammer worm IEEE Security
Privacy Mag. 1 33–9
[193] Moravec H P 1988 Mind Children (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press)
[194] Moravec H P 1992 Pigs in cyberspace www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/
~hpm/project.archive/general.articles/1992/CyberPigs.html
[195] Moravec H P 1998 When will computer hardware match the
human brain? J. Evolution Technol. 1 www.transhumanist.
com/volume1/moravec.htm
[196] Moravec H P 1999 Robot (New York: Oxford University
Press)
[197] Moskowitz G B, Li P and Kirk E R 2004 The implicit volition
model Adv. Experimen. Social Psychol. 36 317–413
[198] Muehlhauser L 2012 Less Wrong www.lesswrong.com/lw/
fmf/overconfident_pessimism/
[199] Muehlhauser L and Helm L 2012 The singularity and
machine ethics Singularity Hypotheses ed A H Eden,
J H Moor, J H Soraker and E Steinhart (Berlin: Springer)
[200] Muehlhauser L and Salamon A 2012 Intelligence explosion
Singularity Hypotheses ed A H Eden, J H Moor,
J H Soraker and E Steinhart (Berlin: Springer)
[201] Murphy R and Woods D D 2009 Beyond Asimov IEEE Intell.
Syst. 24 14–20
[202] Napier W 2011 Hazards from comets and asteroids Global
Catastrophic Risks ed N Bostrom and M M Cirkovic
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp 222–37
[203] Narayanan A and Shmatikov V 2008 Robust de-
anonymization of large sparse datasets 2008 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA: IEEE
Computer Society) pp 111–25
[204] Narayanan A and Shmatikov V 2009 De-anonymizing social
networks 30th IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy
(Berkeley, CA: IEEE Computer Society) pp 173–87
[205] Narayanan A and Shmatikov V 2009 De-anonymizing social
networks www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/socialnetworks-
faq.html
[206] Narayanan A, Paskov H, Gong N Z, Bethencourt J,
Stefanov E, Shin E C R and Song D 2012 On the
30
Phys. Scr. 90 (2015) 018001 Invited Comment
feasibility of internet-scale author identification 2012
IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA: IEEE
Computer Society) pp 300–14
[207] Nielsen T D and Jensen F V 2004 Learning a decision maker's
utility function from (possibly) inconsistent behavior
Artificial Intell. 160 53–78
[208] Nordmann A 2008 Singular simplicity IEEE Spectrum http://
spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/robotics-software/singular-
simplicity
[209] Nordmann A 2007 If and then NanoEthics 1 31–46
[210] Olson M 1982 The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press)
[211] Omohundro S M 2007 The nature of self-improving artificial
intelligence http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/10/05/paper-
on-the-nature-of-self-improving-artificial-intelligence/
[212] Omohundro S M 2008 The basic AI drives Artificial General
Intelligence Frontiers ed P Wang, B Goertzel and S Franklin
(Amsterdam: IOS) pp 483–92
[213] Omohundro S M 2012 Rational artificial intelligence for the
greater Good Singularity Hypotheses ed A H Eden,
J H Moor, J H Soraker and E Steinhart (Berlin: Springer)
[214] Orseau L and Ring M 2011 Self-modification and
mortality in artificial agents Artificial General Intelligence
ed J Schmidhuber, K R Thrisson and M Looks (New York:
Springer) pp 1–10
[215] Persson I and Savulescu J 2008 The perils of cognitive
enhancement and the urgent imperative to enhance the
moral character of humanity J. Appl. Philosophy 25
162–77
[216] Persson I and Savulescu J 2012 Unfit for the Future (Oxford:
Oxford University Press)
[217] Peterson N R, Pisoni D B and Miyamoto R T 2010 Cochlear
implants and spoken language processing abilities
Restorative Neurology and Neuroscience 28 237–50
[218] Pinker S 2002 The Blank Slate (New York: Viking)
[219] Plaut D C 2003 Connectionist modeling of language Mind,
Brain, and Language ed M T Banich and M Mack
pp 143–68 (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum)
[220] Posner R A 2004 Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University
Press)
[221] Potapov A and Rodionov S Universal empathy and ethical
bias for artificial general intelligence http://aideus.com/
research/doc/preprints/04_paper4_AGIImpacts12.pdf
[222] Powers T M 2006 Prospects for a Kantian machine IEEE
Intell. Syst. 21 46–51
[223] Powers T M 2011 Incremental machine ethics IEEE Robotics
Automation Mag. 18 51–8
[224] Pynadath D V and Tambe M 2002 Revisiting Asimov's first
law Intelligent Agents VIII ed J-J Ch Meyer and M Tambe
(Berlin: Springer) pp 307–20
[225] Railton P 1986 Facts and values Phil. Topics 14 5–31
[226] Rajab M A, Zarfoss J, Monrose F and Terzis A 2007 My
botnet is bigger than yours (maybe, better than yours) Proc.
of 1st Workshop on Hot Topics in Understanding Botnets
(HotBots '07) (Berkeley, CA: USENIX) http://static.usenix.
org/event/hotbots07/tech/full_papers/rajab/rajab.pdf
[227] Ramamurthy U, Baars B J, D'Mello S K and Franklin S 2006
LIDAProc. Seventh International Conference on Cognitive
Modeling ed D Fum, F Del Missier and A Stocco (Trieste:
Edizioni Goliardiche) pp 244–9 http://ccrg.cs.memphis.edu/
assets/papers/ICCM06-UR.pdf
[228] Reynolds C and Cassinelli A (ed) 2009 AP-CAP 2009 http://
kant.k2.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ap-cap09/proceedings.pdf
[229] Ring M and Orseau L 2011 Delusion, survival, and intelligent
agents ed J Schmidhuber, K R Thrisson and M Looks (New
York: Springer) pp 11–20
[230] Salekin R T 2010 Treatment of child and adolescent
psychopathy Handbook of Child and Adolescent
Psychopathy ed R T Salekin and D R Lynam (New York:
Guilford) pp 343–73
[231] Sandberg A 2009 An overview of models of technological
singularity http://agi-conf.org/2010/wp-content/uploads/
2009/06/agi10singmodels2.pdf
[232] Sandberg A 2001 Friendly superintelligence www.aleph.se/
Nada/Extro5/FriendlySuperintelligence.htm
[233] Sandberg A 2012 Models of a singularity Singularity
Hypotheses ed A H Eden, J H Moor, J H Soraker and
E Steinhart (Berlin: Springer)
[234] Sandberg A and Bostrom N 2008 Whole brain emulation
Technical Report 2008-3 (Future of Humanity Institute,
University of Oxford) www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/brain-emulation-roadmap-report1.pdf
[235] Sandberg A and Bostrom N 2011 Machine intelligence survey
Technical Report 2011-1 (Future of Humanity Institute,
University of Oxford) www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/reports/2011-1.pdf
[236] Schmidhuber J 2009 Ultimate cognition à la Gödel Cogn.
Comput. 1 177–93
[237] Schmidhuber J, Thrisson K R and Looks M (ed) 2011
Artificial General Intelligence (Lecture Notes in Computer
Science no 6830) (Berlin: Springer)
[238] Scott J C 1998 Seeing Like a State (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press)
[239] Searle J R 1992 The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press)
[240] Shachtman N 2007 Robot cannon kills 9, wounds 14 Wired
www.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/10/robot-cannon-ki/
[241] Shulman C Arms control and intelligence explosions
[242] Shulman C 2010 Whole brain emulation and the evolution of
superorganisms http://intelligence.org/files/WBE-
Superorgs.pdf
[243] Shulman C 2010 Omohundro's basic AI drives and
catastrophic risks http://intelligence.org/files/
BasicAIDrives.pdf
[244] Shulman C and Sandberg A 2010 Implications of a software-
limited singularity ECAP10, VIII European Conference of
Computing and Philosophy ed K Mainzer (Munich: Dr Hut)
[245] Shulman C, Jonsson H and Tarleton N 2009 Which
consequentialism? Machine ethics and moral divergence AP-
CAP 2009 ed C Reynolds and A Cassinelli pp 23–5 http://
kant.k2.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ap-cap09/proceedings.pdf
[246] Shulman C, Jonsson H and Tarleton N 2009 Machine ethics
and superintelligence AP-CAP 2009 ed C Reynolds and
A Cassinelli pp 95–7 http://kant.k2.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ap-cap09/
proceedings.pdf
[247] Smith M 2009 Desires, values, reasons, and the dualism of
practical reason Ratio 22 98–125
[248] Snaider J, Mccall R and Franklin S 2011 The LIDA
framework as a general tool for AGI Artificial General
Intelligence (Lecture Notes in Computer Science no 6830)
ed J Schmidhuber, K R Thrisson and M Looks (New York:
Springer) pp 133–42
[249] Sobel D 1994 Full information accounts of well-being Ethics
104 784–810
[250] Sobolewski M 2012 German Cabinet to agree tougher rules
on high-frequency trading (Reuters) http://in.reuters.com/
article/2012/09/25/germany-bourse-rules-idINL5E8KP8BK
20120925
[251] Solomono R J 1985 The time scale of artificial intelligence
Human Syst. Management 5 149–53
[252] Solum L B 1992 Legal personhood for artificial intelligences
North Carolina Law Rev. 70 1231–87 http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108671
[253] Sotala K 2012 Advantages of artificial intelligences, uploads,
and digital minds Int. J. Machine Consciousness 4 275–91
[254] Sotala K and Valpola H 2012 Coalescing minds Int. J.
Machine Consciousness 4 293–312
31
Phys. Scr. 90 (2015) 018001 Invited Comment
[255] Spears D F 2006 Assuring the behavior of adaptive agents ed
C Rou, M Hinchey, J Rash, W Truszkowski and
D F Gordon-Spears Agent Technology from a Formal
Perspective (NASA Monographs in Systems and Software
Engineering) (New York: Springer) pp 227–57
[256] Stahl B C 2002 Can a computer adhere to the categorical
imperative? A contemplation of the limits of transcendental
ethics in IT 14th Int. Conf. on Systems Research, Informatics
and Cybernetics: Symposium on Cognitive, Emotive and
Ethical Aspects of Decision Making in Humans and in
Artificial Intelligence (Windsor, ON: International Institute
for Advanced Studies in Systems Research/Cybernetics)
pp 13–8
[257] Staniford S, Paxson V and Weaver N 2002 How to own the
internet in your spare time Proc. 11th USENIX Security
Symp. ed D Boneh pp 149–67 www.icir.org/vern/papers/
cdc-usenix-sec02/
[258] Steunebrink B R and Schmidhuber J 2011 A family of Gödel
machine implementations Artificial General Intelligence
(Lecture Notes in Computer Science no 6830) ed
J Schmidhuber, K R Thrisson and M Looks (New York:
Springer) pp 275–80
[259] Suber P 2002 Saving machines from themselves www.
earlham.edu/~peters/writing/selfmod.htm
[260] Sullins J P 2005 Ethics and artificial life Ethics Inf. Technol.
7 139–48
[261] Sullins J P 2006 When is a robot a moral agent? Int. Rev. Inf.
Ethics 6 23–30
[262] Stillwaggon Swan L and Howard J 2012 Digital immortality
Int. J. Machine Consciousness 4 245–56
[263] Sweeney L 1997 Weaving technology and policy together to
maintain confidentiality J. Law Med. Ethics 25 98–110
[264] Tanyi A 2006 An essay on the desire-based reasons model
http://web.ceu.hu/polsci/dissertations/Attila_Tanyi.pdf
[265] Tarleton N 2010 Coherent extrapolated volition http://
intelligence.org/files/CEV-MachineEthics.pdf
[266] Tenenbaum J B, Grifiths T L and Kemp C 2006 Theory-based
Bayesian models of inductive learning and reasoning Trends
Cogn. Sci. 10 309–18
[267] ThomasMSC andMcClelland J L 2008 Connectionist models
of cognition The Cambridge Handbook of Computational
Psychology (Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology) ed R Sun
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp 23–58
[268] Trope Y and Liberman N 2010 Construal-level theory of
psychological distance Psychological Rev 117 440–63
[269] Turing A M 1951 Intelligent machinery, a heretical theory
[270] Turney P 1991 Controlling super-intelligent machines Can.
Artificial Intell. 27 3–35
[271] Tversky A and Kahneman D 1981 The framing of decisions
and the psychology of choice Science 211 453–58
[272] van Gelder T 1995 What might cognition be, if not
computation? J. Philosophy 92 345–81
[273] van Kleef G A, Oveis C, van der Lwe I, LuoKogan A,
Goetz J and Keltner D 2008 Power, distress, and compassion
Psychological Sci. 19 1315–22
[274] van Kleef G A, Homan A C, Finkenauer C, Gündemir S and
Stamkou E 2011 Breaking the rules to rise to power Social
Psychological Personality Sci. 2 500–7
[275] Verdoux P 2010 Risk mysterianism and cognitive boosters
J. Futures Studies 15 1–20 (www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/15-1/
A01.pdf)
[276] Verdoux P 2011 Emerging technologies and the future of
philosophy Metaphilosophy 42 682–707
[277] Versenyi L 1974 Can robots be moral? Ethics 84 248–59
[278] Vinge V 1993 The coming technological singularity Vision-
21 (NASA Conference Publication no 10129) (NASA Lewis
Research Center) pp 11–22 (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/
nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19940022855_1994022855.pdf)
[279] Walker M 2008 Human extinction and farsighted universal
surveillance www.nmsu.edu/~philos/documents/sept-2008-
smart-dust-final.doc
[280] Walker M 2011 Personal identity and uploading J. Evolution
Technol. 22 37–51
[281] Wallach W 2010 Robot minds and human ethics Ethics Inf.
Technol. 12 243–50
[282] Wallach W and Allen C 2009 Moral Machines (Oxford:
Oxford University Press)
[283] Wallach W and Allen C 2012 Framing robot arms control
Ethics Inf. Technol. 15
[284] Wallach W, Allen C and Smit I 2008 Machine morality AI
Society 22 565–82
[285] Wallach W, Franklin S and Allen C 2010 A conceptual and
computational model of moral decision making in human
and artificial agents Topics Cogn. Sci. 2 454–85
[286] Wallach W, Allen C and Franklin S 2011 Consciousness and
ethics Int. J. Machine Consciousness 3 177–92
[287] Wang P 2012 Motivation management in AGI systems 2012
Artificial General Intelligence (Lecture Notes in Artificial
Intelligence no 7716) ed J Bach, B Goertzel and M Ikl (New
York: Springer) pp 352–61
[288] Wang P, Goertzel B and Franklin S (ed) 2008 Artificial
General Intelligence Frontiers (Artificial Intelligence and
Applications no 171) (Amsterdam: IOS)
[289] Warwick K 1998 In the Mind of the Machine (London:
Arrow)
[290] Warwick K 2003 Cyborg morals, cyborg values, cyborg
ethics Ethics Inf. Technol. 5 131–7
[291] Warwick K 2010 Implications and consequences of robots
with biological brains Ethics Inf. Technol. 12 223–4
[292] Waser M R 2008 Discovering the foundations of a universal
system of ethics as a road to safe artificial intelligence
Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures Technical
Report FS-08-04 pp 195–200 (www.aaai.org/Papers/
Symposia/Fall/2008/FS-08-04/FS08-04-049.pdf)
[293] Waser M R 2009 A safe ethical system for intelligent
machines Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures ed
A V Samsonovich pp 194–9 (www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/
FSS/FSS09/paper/view/934)
[294] Waser M R 2011 Rational universal benevolence Artificial
General Intelligence ed J Schmidhuber, K R Thrisson and
M Looks (New York: Springer) pp 153–62
[295] Weld D and Etzioni O 1994 The first law of robotics (a call to
arms) Proc. Twelfth National Conf. on Artificial Intelligence
ed B Hayes-Roth and R E Korf (Menlo Park, CA: AAAI
Press) pp 1042–7 (www.aaai.org/Papers/AAAI/1994/
AAAI94-160.pdf)
[296] Weng Y-H, Chen C-H and Sun C-T 2008 Safety
intelligence and legal machine language Service Robot
Applications ed Y Takahashi (InTech)
[297] Weng Y-H, Chen C-H and Sun C-T 2009 Toward the
human–robot co-existence society Int. J. Social Robotics 1
267–82
[298] Whitby B 1996 Reflections on Artificial Intelligence (Exeter:
Intellect)
[299] Whitby B and Oliver K 2000 How to avoid a robot takeover
www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/blayw/BlayAISB00.html
[300] Wiener N 1960 Some moral and technical consequences of
automation Science 131 1355–8
[301] Wilson G S 2014 Minimizing global catastrophic and
existential risks from emerging technologies through
international law Virginia Environ Law J. 31 307–64
[302] Wilson T D 2002 Strangers to Ourselves (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap)
[303] Yampolskiy R V 2012 Leakproofing the singularity: artificial
intelligence confinement problem J. Consciousness Studies
1 194–214
32
Phys. Scr. 90 (2015) 018001 Invited Comment
[304] Yampolskiy R V 2013 Artificial intelligence safety
engineering Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence
(Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational
Ethics vol 5) (New York: Springer) pp 389–96
[305] Yampolskiy R V and Fox J 2012 Safety engineering for
artificial general intelligence Topoi doi:10.1007/s11245-
012-9128-9
[306] Yudkowsky E 2001 Creating friendly AI 1.0 http://
intelligence.org/files/CFAI.pdf
[307] Yudkowsky E 2004 Coherent extrapolated volition http://
intelligence.org/files/CEV.pdf
[308] Yudkowsky E 2008 Hard takeoff Less Wrong http://
lesswrong.com/lw/wf/hard_takeoff/
[309] Yudkowsky E 2009 Value is fragile Less Wrong http://
lesswrong.com/lw/y3/value_is_fragile/
[310] Yudkowsky E 2012 Reply to Holden on tool AI Less Wrong
http://lesswrong.com/lw/cze/reply_to_holden_on_tool_ai/
[311] Yudkowsky E 1996 Staring into the singularity http://
yudkowsky.net/obsolete/singularity.html
[312] Yudkowsky E 2011 Artificial intelligence as a positive and
negative factor in global risk Global Catastrophic Risks
ed N Bostrom and M M Cirkovic (Oxford: Oxford
University Press) pp 308–45
[313] Yudkowsky E 2011 Complex value systems are required to
realize valuable futures http://intelligence.org/files/
ComplexValues.pdf
[314] Zimmerman D 2003 Why Richard Brandt does not need
cognitive psychotherapy, and other glad news about
idealized preference theories in meta-ethics J. Value Inquiry
37 373–94
33
Phys. Scr. 90 (2015) 018001 Invited Comment
